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 POLIZIANO AND PHILOSOPHY
 THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN NOTION
 OF THE HUMANITIES?
 By AMOS EDELHEIT
 This article is focused on Angelo Poliziano's general attitude to philosophy
 as a discipline and on his specific accounts of scholastic philosophy, found
 mainly in his four opening lectures to his courses on Aristotle's logic and eth
 ics that were held in the Florentine Studium between 1490 and 1494, in the
 light of his overall exclusive classical approach. It shows, among other things,
 that philosophy was more important to Poliziano than common expressions
 such as "the humanist interest in philosophy" may suggest. Poliziano's impor
 tant definition of history presented in his Panepistemon, together with other
 pieces of evidence, can reveal the moment in which disciplines associated with
 the "humanities" (in the modern sense of this term) began to be separated
 from the natural sciences — at a point just preceding the massive critique of
 Aristotelian science during the sixteenth century — through Poliziano's notion
 of a philosophical literature to which also the Aristotelian texts belong.
 Some longstanding scholarly views concerning Renaissance humanism
 have been revised in recent years. Ronald Witt's books dealing with the
 issue of the starting point of the humanist movement and fashion in Italy
 (around the middle of the thirteenth century, instead of the accepted view
 of the mid-fourteenth century — that is, two generations before Petrarch,
 the so-called father of Renaissance humanism), and with the most crucial
 discipline for this starting point (grammar instead of rhetoric), is one obvi
 ous example of this new outlook.1 Another case is that of the formerly
 prevalent views of the relations between Renaissance humanism and the
 humanists on the one hand and philosophy on the other. In this case too,
 as we shall shortly see, more adequate scholarly accounts were needed in
 order to revise some of the so-called standard views.
 In this article I shall further investigate the relations between human
 ists and philosophy in general, and more specifically scholastic philoso
 1 Ronald G. Witt, In the Footsteps of the Ancients: The Origins of Humanism from
 Lovato to Bruni (Leiden, 2003); idem, The Two Latin Cultures and the Foundation
 of Renaissance Humanism in Medieval Italy (Cambridge, 2012). But see the review
 article of the second of these books by Alexander Murray: "Out of Limbo: Devotion,
 Erudition and an Anticlerical Strain in a Remarkable Study of the 'All-Conquering
 Classical Enthusiasm' that Nourished the Renaissance," The Times Literary Supple
 ment (January 11, 2013): 3-4, for some limitations in Witt's perspective concerning
 theological matters and the role of religion in the Italian Renaissance.
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 phy, through a close examination of the case of Angelo Poliziano. I shall
 present a fresh account of the relations between Poliziano and philoso
 phy, classical and scholastic, with special attention to his interest in logic
 and dialectic. I shall focus mainly on Poliziano's four opening lectures for
 his courses on Aristotelian ethics and logic held in the University of Flor
 ence in the early 1490s (the Panepistemon of 1490-91, the opening lecture
 for a course on the Ethics-, the Praelectio de dialectica of 1491-92, the
 opening lecture for a course on Porphyry's Isagoge and on Aristotle's Cat
 egories and On Interpretation; the Lamia of 1492-93, the opening lecture
 for a course on the Prior Analytics and On Sophistical Refutations; and
 the Dialectica of 1493-94, the opening lecture for a course on the Poste
 rior Analytics and the Topics, which also includes another account of On
 Interpretation), but I shall refer also to his translations of Plato's Charmi
 des and Epictetus's Enchiridion, and to his interest in Sextus Empiricus.
 Poliziano's interest in philosophical and theological matters was not
 occasional or accidental. He was among the humanists who participated
 in a famous scholastic debate on the question of evil that took place
 in Florence in 1489 between two scholastic thinkers (Nicolaus de Mira
 bilibus and Giorgio Benigno Salviati),2 and we know that his interest in
 scholastic logic was not a very late development in his intellectual inter
 ests, nor was his interest in philosophy only the result of Pico's influence
 during the late 1480s.3 The fact that a scholastic thinker, the Dominican
 Francesco di Tommaso, dedicated a dialogue on scholastic logic to Poliz
 iano in 1480 is good evidence for Poliziano's longstanding and serious
 interest in philosophical issues. An even earlier piece of evidence is Poliz
 2 For a detailed account of Poliziano's intervention in this debate in the context
 of humanist theology, see Salvatore I. Camporeale, "L'esegesi umanistica del Valla e
 il simposio teologico di Lorenzo il Magnifico a palazzo Medici: L'intervento di Poliz
 iano," in Poliziano nel suo tempo: Atti del VI convegno internazionale (Chianciano
 Montepulciano 18-21 luglio 1994), ed. Luisa Secchi Tarugi (Florence, 1996), 283-95.
 For more general accounts, see Armando F. Verde, Lo studio fiorentino 1473-1503:
 Ricerche e documenti, vol. 4, La vita universitaria (Florence, 1985), 822-29; Jill Kraye,
 "Lorenzo and the Philosophers," in Classical Traditions in Renaissance Philosophy
 (Aldershot, 2002), chap. 4. For a detailed analysis of the main arguments in this
 debate and their implications, see Amos Edelheit, Scholastic Florence: Moral Psychol
 ogy in the Quattrocento (Leiden, 2014), 33-81.
 3 The crucial mention of Pico's role in encouraging Poliziano to study philosophy
 can be found in Poliziano's 1489 Miscellanea, which is cited and discussed in Cristo
 pher S. Celenza, "Poliziano's Lamia in Context," in Angelo Poliziano's Lamia: Text,
 Translation, and Introductory Studies (Leiden, 2010), 1-45, at 34 and 34n82, where
 we find that "is [Picus] me institit ad philosophiam, non, ut antea, somniculosis,
 sed vegetis vigilantibusque oculis explorandum, quasi quodam suae vocis animare
 classico." Celenza's account is a very useful starting point for an examination of the
 relations between Poliziano and philosophy.
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 iano's translation of Plato's Charmides, probably from the late 1470s.4
 But already in 1473 we find echoes of such interests in Poliziano's elegy
 to Bartolomeo Fonzio, where we have, for instance, references to Ficino
 and his critique of Epicurus.5 This interest should be studied in the
 context of the new status assigned to philosophy by several humanists
 and humanist-oriented philosophers who were part of Poliziano's close
 circle, such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino, Cristoforo
 Landino, and Ermolao Barbaro, and its results should probably redraw
 the boundaries between Renaissance humanism and scholasticism, while
 avoiding the common scholarly fallacy of prioritizing the humanists over
 the scholastics or of disregarding the sincere interest of some human
 ists in scholastic philosophy. Moreover, as I shall try to show in what
 follows, focusing on Poliziano's interests in philosophy and on his four
 opening lectures to his courses on Aristotle can reveal the moment in
 which disciplines associated with the "humanities" (in the modern sense
 of this term) began to be separated from the natural sciences, at a point
 just preceding the massive critique of Aristotelian science during the six
 teenth century, through Poliziano's notion of a philosophical literature to
 which also the Aristotelian texts belong.
 Poliziano's Panepistemon opens with a methodological call to follow
 the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle and to begin the study of
 Aristotle's writings by dividing Aristotelian philosophy into different cat
 egories.6 But already at this stage Poliziano points out that his method
 4 On this text see James Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance (Leiden, 1990),
 2:449-53. For Poliziano's preface to this translation, and for Badius's remarks on
 this preface and on Ficino's and Poliziano's translations, see ibid., 623-29. At 449,
 Hankins points out how little scholarly attention this translation by Poliziano has
 received. One should add that Poliziano's general attitude to philosophy has not
 attracted enough scholarly attention either and that his interest in philosophy is still
 regarded as very marginal in comparison to his philological achievements. The fact
 that we find Plato, beside Homer and Demostenes, mentioned among his Musarum
 instrumenta in a letter to Lorenzo cited and discussed by Hankins, at 450-51, is yet
 another example of this.
 5 Angelo Poliziano, Due poemelti latini: Elegia a Bartolomeo Fonzio; Epicedio di
 Albiera degli Albizi, ed. Francesco Bausi (Rome, 2003); see Ad Bartholomaeum Fon
 tium, verses 155—90. And see an account of this elegy for Fonzio in Celenza, "Poli
 ziano's Lamia in Context," 3. An important comparison between Poliziano's Pan
 epistemon and Fonzio's Oratio in bonas artes can be found in Jean-Marc Mandosio,
 "Filosofia, arti e scienze: 1'enciclopedismo di Angelo Poliziano," in Poliziano nel suo
 tempo, ed. Tarugi, 135-64, at 145-46.
 6 Angelo Poliziano, Omnia opera (Venice, 1498), Y8v: "Qui libros aliquos enarrare
 Aristotelis ingrediuntur consuevere a principio statim philosophiam ipsam velut in
 membra partiri, quod et Themistium facere videmus, et Simplicium et Ammonium et
 alios item peripateticos veteres." Compare Poliziano's method of dividing the Aris
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 of division in his interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics will be different from
 previous methods of division, since he will include in the discussion not
 only disciplines (disciplinae) and arts (artes), both liberal (liberales) and
 mechanical (machinales), but also base (sordidae) and low-ranking (sellu
 lariae) arts. The reason for this is that these arts are also needed in life,
 and they are therefore to be included in this new division, a reflection of
 the whole of human knowledge, offered here by Poliziano.7 In doing so,
 Poliziano is telling us, he is following two professional groups (sectiones):
 doctors who specialized in anatomy and mathematicians who are mak
 ing calculations by using special boards.8 The principle behind it is that
 through this practice of dividing individual matters into smaller parts
 and then restoring them to their wholeness, every part in them could
 either be more easily perceived or remembered in a more trustworthy
 manner.9 It can be said that Poliziano is describing here something simi
 lar to the practice of Siaipeaiç, found in some of the later Platonic dia
 logues such as the Sophist or Statesman.
 Poliziano is not worried by the thought that this is a difficult task that
 so far has not been proposed and performed by anyone, facts that can
 provide an opportunity for his detractors to criticize and attack him.10
 This constant presence of critics, who are not mentioned by name but
 who nevertheless seem to be coming from local Florentine Aristotelian
 and scholastic circles, is implied in all four of the opening lectures by
 totelian philosophy, and philosophy and science or knowledge in general, to Argyro
 poulos's method found in his Praefatio in libris Ethicorum quinque primis, in Reden
 und Briefen italienischer Humanisten, ed. Karl Müllner (Vienna, 1899), reedited with
 bibliography and indices by Barbara Gerl (Munich, 1970), 3-18. For a different inter
 pretation of the Panepislemon see Heikki Mikkeli, "The Aristotelian Classification of
 Knowledge in the Early Sixteenth Century," in Renaissance Readings of the Corpus
 Arislotelicum: Proceedings of the Conference Held in Copenhagen 23-25 April 1998, ed.
 Marianne Fade (Copenhagen, 2001), 103-27, especially 110-18. An early version of
 the Panepistemon, found in Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana MS 2723, fols. 73v-74v,
 was published in Ida Maïer, "Un inédit de Politien: La classification des 'arts,'" in
 Bibliothèque d'humanisme et Renaissance 22 (1960): 338-55; the text is on 343-44.
 ' Ibid.: "Mihi vero nunc Aristotelis eiusdem libros de moribus interpretanti con
 silium est, ita divisionem istius modi aggredi, ut quoad eius fieri possit, non disci
 plinae modo et artes, vel liberales quae dicuntur vel machinales, sed etiam sordidae
 illae ac sellulariae, quibus tamen vita indiget, intra huius ambitum distributionis
 colligantur."
 8 Ibid.: "Imitabor igitur sectiones illas medicorum quas anatomas vocant. Imitabor
 et tabularium calculos."
 9 Ibid., Y8v-Zlr: "Nam et dividam singula prope minutatim et in summam sum
 marum redigam, quo possit unumquodque vel facilius percipi vel fidelius retineri."
 10 Ibid., Zlr: "Nec autem me fallit quam sit operis ardui, quod nec ab ullo tenta
 tum hactenus, quam denique obtrectatoribus opportunum quod polliceor."
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 Poliziano. But in the Panepistemon, as we have just seen and as we shall
 see in what follows, we find an argument in support of explicit novel
 ties that goes beyond the standard, albeit implicit, manner in which new
 ideas and theories are introduced in scholastic discourses. According to
 Poliziano, the common or wonted (usitata) practices (probably the man
 ners of classifying sciences and disciplines by the scholastics) are, on the
 one hand, exceedingly worn out (exculcata nimis) and practically worth
 less (sordent), while he, on the other hand, has learned not to follow in
 the footsteps of others, since in matters of importance his own will is
 not devoid of excellence. Poliziano adds that Plato regarded imitators
 as the most worthless among human beings (probably referring to the
 famous critique of poets found in the Republic), and he was followed by
 Horace who called such men servile cattle (servum pecus).n His scholas
 tic rivals, Poliziano complains, will look for every opportunity (occasio),
 for no good reason at all, to attack him.12 What is it that seems to be
 bothering them? According to Poliziano, his own use of Greek words in
 his discussion of the arts while his rivals hardly know Latin is one rea
 son; but, Poliziano explains, many matters that are common to various
 arts and disciplines are so obvious that it is enough to point them out
 with one's finger. Now, Poliziano asks his readers to pay attention and
 show favor toward one who offers them great utility emerging from a
 clear and short division of so many matters. Then, they will experience
 the delight that comes from an erudite and somewhat new variety of
 different concepts.13 Greater utility and delight will be the outcome of
 this new method of dividing arts and disciplines offered by Poliziano to
 replace the common and much too habitual methods. And here comes a
 rather surprising statement:
 You should not, however, expect here either a display of speech or dec
 orations of words, nor cosmetics of colorful language. For as Manilius
 11 Ibid.: "Sed ita homo sum. Sordent usitata ista et exculcata nimis, nec alienis
 demum vestigiis insistere didici, quoniam in magnis etiam voluntas ipsa laude sua
 non caret, et vilissimos hominum Plato existimat imitatores, meritoque ob id vate
 Horatio [Ep. I, 19, 19] servum pecus appellati sunt."
 12 Ibid., Zlr: "Obtrectatorum vero nulla prorsus habenda ratio, qui si nunc desit
 occasio, facile tarnen invenient alteram."
 13 Ibid.: "Illud obsecro ne quenquam perturbet, quod ipsis artium vocabulis
 etiamque Graecis utar interdum, si quidem pleraque sic exposita reperiuntur, ut
 Latine nondum loqui didicerint, sed et multa diversis artibus disciplinisque com
 munia semel explicata, mox quasi digito notari, nutuque significari sat erit. Nunc
 adeste animis quaeso, et auribus omnes, ac favete dicenti magnam (ni fallor) et ex
 perspicua brevique rerum tantarum distinctione utilitatem, et ex erudita quadam
 novaque vocum diversarum varietate voluptatem percepturi."
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 the astronomer elegantly says, the matter itself rejects being decorated,
 being content in being taught.14
 Coming from Poliziano's mouth, this rather standard apologetic state
 ment that we usually find in the beginning of a scholastic account, in
 many cases addressing a humanist audience, is indeed surprising.15 This
 statement is immediately followed by the first division, and so, at this
 point, we move from the opening section to the actual presentation of
 the new division of the arts and disciplines.
 Poliziano begins by saying that there are three kinds of doctrines
 among human beings: inspired, acquired, and mixed. Theology belongs
 to the first, philosophy as the mother of arts to the second, and divi
 nation to the third.16 God is the object of theology, and the Scriptures
 are its instrument.17 Philosophy is divided into three: speculative (spec
 tativa), practical (actualis), and rational (rationalis). Speculative philoso
 phy has three objects: material things, things that are detached from
 matter, and things in the middle, that is, between material and immate
 rial. Some of these things in the middle are joined with real (material)
 things (re coniundae) and are separated from them through an act of
 14 Ibid.: "Nec pompam tarnen hic orationis aut verborum phaleras expecteris, et
 pictae tectoria linguae. Nam quod eleganter Manilius inquit astronomus [Astronomi
 con, 3, 39]: ornari res ipsa negat contenta doceri." The same citation from Manilius
 can be found in Pico's prooemium to his De ente et uno, which was dedicated to Poliz
 iano; see Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et
 uno, e scriiti vari, ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence, 1942), 388. And see now in the more
 recent critical edition of this text, Dell'Ente e dell'Uno, ed. Raphael Ebgi and Franco
 Bacchelli (Milan, 2011), 204.
 15 See, e.g., Niccolo Tignosi's prologue to his commentary on the Nicomachean Eth
 ics, cited in David A. Lines, Aristotle's Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300
 1650): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education (Leiden, 2002), 192n33:
 "Quisquis has glosulas lecturus es, quoniam elegantes minimum conscriptae sunt,
 praecor latio conveniens pone supercilium [Periapea 1.2]. Non enim omnia possu
 mus omnes." And see also Vincenzo Bandello da Castelnuovo, "Opusculum Fratris
 Vincentii de Castronovo Ordinis Praedicatorum ad magnificum ac generosum virum
 Laurentium Medicem quod beatitudo hominis in actu intellectus et non voluntatis
 essentialiter consistit incipit," in Le Thomisme et la pensée italienne de la renaissance,
 ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller (Paris, 1967), 187-278; see 196: "Reliquum est, Magnifice
 Laurenti, ut si in verborum compositione ornatuque sententiarum nos deficere tua
 eloquentia iudicarit, non propterea munusculum hoc minus gratum habeas. Siquidem
 theologorum consuetudinem imitamur, qui longo suo exemplo docuerunt oratione
 simplici huiscemodi gravissimas quaestiones clarius ab omnibus intelligi posse."
 18 Poliziano, Omnia opera, Zlr: "Tria sunt igitur inter homines genera doctrina
 rum: inspiratum, inventum, mixtum. In primo genere theologia nostra; in secundo
 mater artium philosophia; in tertio divinatio sita est."
 17 Ibid.
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 the intellect (intellectione distractae). These things are either substances or
 accidents. These accidents are yet again divided into accidents through
 being a multitude and accidents through being a magnitude. Multitude
 is divided into absolute and relative; magnitude is divided into abiding
 and changing.18 From this speculative philosophy, just as in a natural
 pedigree (stemma naturale), are born first philosophy, which investigates
 the soul, and four mathematical disciplines (the traditional quadrivium):
 arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. These disciplines are fol
 lowed by yet other disciplines.19
 Practical philosophy expounds customs and ways of behavior (mores)
 on individual, family, and city or community levels. This triple offspring
 conducts the administration of moral and civil matters.20 By rational phi
 losophy, Poliziano means an extended version of the traditional trivium.
 Here we find logic, dialectic, rhetoric, poetry, grammar, and history.21
 Poliziano next discusses natural philosophy, in the beginning of the
 following section of the Panepistemon, which is dedicated to a detailed
 account of each part of philosophy. Natural philosophy clearly belongs
 to the speculative part. It focuses on matters that generally are pres
 ent in (material) things (communiter insunt rebus), such as (material)
 principles and things related to them or proceeding from them, or on
 matters that only seem to be present but in fact are not, like vacuum
 (inane) and infinity (infinitum).22 It is rather difficult to understand
 18 Ibid.: "Philosophia spectativa est, actualis, rationalis. Sed spectativa pars aut
 res considérât materiae prorsus implicitas, aut a materia penitus abiunctas, aut
 médias, quasdam re coniunctas, intellectione distractas, easque vel substantias vel
 accidentia; rursus haec, aut qua multitudo sunt, aut qua magnitudo. Multitudo ut
 absoluta ut relata. Magnitudo ut manens ut mobilis."
 19 Ibid.: "Ex hoc igitur spectativi generis quasi stemmate naturalis, et prima phi
 losophia tum quae de anima pertractat, et mathematicae quatuor seu doctrinales:
 arithmetica, musica, geometria, et sphaerica, cum suis illis quasi pedissequis: calcu
 latoria, geodesia, canonice, astrologia, optica, et mecanica nascuntur."
 20 Ibid.: "Actualis pars mores expendit, sed aut singulorum, aut familiae, aut civi
 tatis. Unde quasi trigeminus partus moralem dispensativam civilemque pertulit."
 21 Ibid., Zlr-v: "Rationalis aut indicat, aut narrat, aut demonstrat, aut suadet,
 aut oblectat. Unde grammatica, historia, dialectica, rhetorica, et poetica emerse
 runt." On this see Ari Wesseling, "Poliziano and Ancient Rhetoric: Theory and Prac
 tice," Rinascimento 30 (1990): 191-204, especially 194, where the author identifies
 the hidden source for Poliziano's account of rhetoric, grammar, and logic: Martianus
 Capella's De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii. On the other sources (Quintilian, Augus
 tine, and Isidore) see ibid., nnlO-ll.
 22 Ibid., Zlv: "Naturalis aut circa ea versatur quae communiter insunt rebus, aut
 circa ea quae videntur inesse, nec insunt. Inesse videntur nec insunt inane et infi
 nitum. Insunt aut vel principia, vel quae principiis adnexa, vel quae de principiis
 exorta."
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 what exactly Poliziano means in his references to vacuum and infinity
 here, two aspects that are denied existence in Aristotelian physics but,
 despite Aristotle's objections, are much discussed by ancient, medieval,
 and Renaissance philosophers.23 Does he mean that these aspects are not
 present in the material world because of their "nature" or "quality" not
 to be present (and thus they exist as part of reality), or does he mean
 that they do not exist in reality, thus following a standard Aristotelian
 view? The first possibility might bring us to the conclusion that what
 we have here in Poliziano's account of the objects of natural philosophy
 is an important and explicit step away from the framework of Aristote
 lian physics, at the heart of his new scientific scheme, and as part of his
 opening lecture for his course on Aristotle's Ethics. But it is more likely
 that Poliziano simply follows the Aristotelian position here.
 Given the institutional affinity in the Italian universities between nat
 ural philosophy and medicine, and the fact that natural philosophy was
 mainly taught in medical faculties,24 it is not surprising that Poliziano
 regards medicine as the pupil (alumna) of natural philosophy and thus pro
 vides a rather detailed and technical account of the medical disciplines.25
 Focusing on first philosophy, Poliziano argues that it investigates God,
 minds (mentes) that are separated from the body, and also many prin
 ciples of all doctrines that we call axioms, through their footprints in
 nature.26 Another object of investigation of first philosophy is the soul,
 and Poliziano presents the standard triple division into vegetative, sensi
 ble, and rational powers or faculties (vires), and their subdivisions.27 This
 is followed by a very interesting account of two "tendencies" (expetitio
 nes): one in reason, or rather in the rational faculty of the soul, which is
 the will (voluntas)-, and one in the senses, or rather in the sensible faculty
 23 For one example of supporting the idea of the existence of actual infinity in
 the created world according to Richard Kilvington, see Elzbieta Jung and Robert
 Podkonski, "The Transmission of English Ideas in the Fourteenth Century: The Case
 of Richard Kilvington," Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 37, no. 3 (2008): 59-69,
 especially 64-67. For important general accounts of the concept of space see Keimpe
 Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (Leiden, 1995); Edward Grant, Much Ado
 about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific
 Revolution (Cambridge, 1981).
 24 For an account of the academic status of natural philosophy in the Italian uni
 versities see Paul F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Raltimore,
 2002), 267-313.
 25 Poliziano, Omnia opera, Zlv.
 26 Ibid.: "Prima philosophia deum mentesque corpore seiunctas, ac multiplicia doc
 trinarum omnium principia quae vocamus axiomata, sed naturae vestigiis indagat."
 27 Ibid., Zlv-Z2r.
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 of the soul, which is irascibility (iracundia) or desire (libido).28 Expetilio
 should be understood here as a tendency toward action through a certain
 impulse. The nature of this impulse is determined according to the fac
 ulty of the soul to which it belongs. Thus, what we seem to have here
 in Poliziano's definition of the will is something like a rational impulse.
 This definition, which is very close to that of Thomas Aquinas and most
 of the Thomists in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, who — very
 differently from John Duns Scotus and his followers, who emphasized the
 independence of the will from reason and the intellect — regarded the
 will as subject to reason and defined it as a rational appetite (appeiitus
 rationalis). But Poliziano does not seem very keen to enter into these
 debates among medieval and Renaissance scholastic schools.29 He rather
 prefers at this point to present an important patristic source for human
 psychology: Nemesius's De natura hominis. This strategy reflects well the
 humanist approach and its philosophical preferences.
 The significant difference between the triple division of the soul pre
 sented by Poliziano, which can be regarded as Aristotelian, and the one
 of Nemesius, lies in the fact that, beyond the change in terminology for
 each of the three faculties (animalis, Vitalis, naturalis), we find all the
 intellectual and sensual abilities in the first faculty, while the other two
 contain only the physical aspects of a living human being.30 This struc
 ture, which sharply distinguishes the intellectual and sensible level from
 the corporeal level, is obviously more compatible with the Christian doc
 trine of the immortality of the soul than the Aristotelian division, where
 the intellectual abilities are completely dependent on the function of the
 imagination and of the senses, which are connected to corporeal organs
 28 Ibid., Z2r: "Expetitio vero in ratione voluntas, in sensibus, aut iracundia est,
 aut libido."
 29 Ibid. On these debates see, e.g., the studies of Guido Alliney, "La contingenza
 della fruizione beatifica nello sviluppo del pensiero di Duns Scoto," in Via Scoti:
 Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti; Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazio
 nale, Roma 9-11 marzo 1993, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome, 1995), 2:633-60; idem, "Fra
 Scoto e Ockham: Giovanni di Reading e il dibattito sulla libertà a Oxford (1310—
 1320)," Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 7 (1996): 243-368; idem,
 "La ricezione della teoria scotiana della volontà nell'ambiente teologico parigino
 (1307-1316)," Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 14 (2005): 339
 404; idem, "The Treatise on the Human Will in the Collationes oxonienses Attributed
 to John Duns Scotus," Medioevo 30 (2005): 209-69.
 30 Ibid.: "Nemesius autem sic in libro De homine. Vis inquit animae triplex est:
 animalis, Vitalis, naturalis. Primi generis mens, phantasia, ratiocinatio, memoria,
 cogitatio. Tum opinio, sensusque particulares et quicunque motus ab electione pro
 ficiscuntur. Secundum genus in respiratione continetur et pulsibus. Tertium vero in
 gignendo, nutriendo, augendo, continendo, transmutando, excernendo."
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 and thus perishable. But this aspect does not seem to bother Poliziano at
 all, since he immediately relates each part of the soul, including reason,
 to a corporeal organ.31
 Following short accounts of other disciplines included in first philoso
 phy, such as arithmetic, music, astrology, and optics, with an important
 section dedicated to mechanics,32 Poliziano moves on to the second part
 of philosophy, the moral part, which is part of politics (civilitas), and in
 which different good matters (bona) are treated. Among these Poliziano
 mentions virtue both of the rational soul and of a soul that obeys and
 follows reason.33 What are the objects of investigation here?
 Therefore, the affections, potencies, and habits of the soul are investi
 gated, and among them excesses and deficiencies, moderate passions,
 judgment, choice, the appetite and its parts: cupidity, rage, will.34
 Once again we see that the will is attached to the appetite, and here
 it is mentioned with two of the appetite's other parts: cupidity and rage.
 Although still subjected to the rational soul, this is not the most flatter
 ing description of the will even by Thomistic standards.
 The virtues are mentioned next, and Poliziano presents twenty-six
 virtues: courage (fortitudo), equanimity (aequanimitas), continence (conti
 nentia), temperance (temperantia), kindness (liberalitas), greatness of soul
 (magnitudo animi), eminence (magnificentia), integrity (honestas), grav
 ity (gravitas), refinement (urbanitas), truthfulness (Veritas), righteous
 ness (iustitia), expertness (scientia), prudence (prudentia), intelligence
 (intellegentia), appraisement (aestimatio), shrewdness (solertia), sagacity
 (sagacitas), friendliness (comitas), heroic virtue (heroica virtus), enjoy
 ment (voluptas), prosperity (prosperitas), friendship (amicitia), benevo
 lence (benevolentia), concord (concordia), and love (amor).35 It would be
 interesting to find out where Poliziano got this multiple list of virtues,
 which cannot be found in any of the Stoic lists and might just be his own
 invention. This catalogue of virtues is immediately followed by a swift
 move to that part of moral philosophy that is related to management
 (dispensativa pars) in general and to politics (civilis pars) in particular,
 31 Ibid.: "Fit et ilia divisio de partibus corporis, ut in cerebro ratio, ira in corde.
 Cupiditas collocetur iecore, quod est virtutibus et vitiis commune seminarium."
 32 Ibid., Z2r-Z3r.
 33 Ibid., Z3r: "Moralis, pars civilitatis est, in qua de bonis agitur diversis. Quorum
 numéro etiam virtus est seu rationalis anime sit, seu rationi obtemperantis."
 34 Ibid.: "Tractantur igitur affectus et potestates et habitus animi, et in his exces
 sus, defectus, mediocritates, arbitrium, electio, appetitus eiusque partes: cupiditas,
 furor, voluntas."
 35 Ibid.
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 including a mention of the standard classical account of the three "good"
 and the three "corrupted" regimes, and then a discussion of some related
 disciplines: civil law and the art of war.36
 After discussing other celebrated arts (artes celebratae) like agriculture,
 pasturing, hunting, architecture, painting, cooking, and some arts related
 to the theater (actors, gladiators, gymnasts, and charioteers), Poliziano
 continues in the same vein and mentions briefly nomenclature and its
 parts, and then many other professions.37 Upon reading this long and
 detailed list of almost any possible art and discipline, including some
 worthless artists (nugatorii artifices), one might think that this is some
 kind of a parody on the notion of practicality and on such detailed discus
 sions with endless divisions and subdivisions. This list ends the account
 of practical philosophy, and Poliziano, after an interesting remark38 that
 yet reinforces the impression that this last section in the Panepistemon,
 focusing on many ultra-practical disciplines, is indeed parodical, immedi
 ately moves on to discuss grammar, which is, as we have seen, already
 part of rational philosophy.
 Grammar is divided into three: methodical, historical, and mixed.
 After a short explanation of each part, Poliziano describes the objects of
 grammar, where he mentions letters, syllables, and parts of speech; like
 ness and unlikeness; errors, orthography, and other matters dealt with by
 this discipline.39
 Poliziano's account of history is interesting:
 History [is divided into two kinds]: fabulous and trustworthy. Fabulous
 history [is divided into a part that aims at causing] pleasure, as in the
 plots used by comic poets, [and another part that aims at] encourage
 ment. The subject matter of this [part] is either based on fiction, like
 the Aesopian fables, or on the solidity of truth, which is put together
 either by means of shameful matters in the case of some poetic fables, or
 concealed in pious veil, which is the only genre the ancient philosophers
 accepted. Trustworthy history deals with places, as geography, or with
 epochs, as chronicles, or with the nature of animals [and] plants, or with
 public affairs, like annals, and other histories, of which the components
 are persons, causes, place, time, mode, instrument, matter, objects. The
 style [used] in history is extended and continuous, not periodical, except
 when it represents speeches made in public gatherings.40
 36 Ibid., Z3r-v.
 37 Ibid., Z3v-Z5r.
 38 Ibid., Z5r: "Sed iam video de fece haurimus. Itaque mox paulo meliora." This
 faex is sharply contrasted to the "celebrated arts according to the authors," described
 on Z3v.
 39 Ibid.
 40 Ibid.: "Historia, vel fabularis vel ad fidem. Fabularis, aut voluptatis, ut in argu
 mentis comicorum, aut adhortationis gratia; haec aut argumentum habet ex ficto ut
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 In this description of history, the second part of rational philosophy,
 we see a most unusual group of arts and disciplines put together. It is
 thus crucial to determine what exactly "history" means for Poliziano. To
 begin, history is not understood by Poliziano either in the ancient or in
 the modern sense of this term. And it is definitely not the way most con
 temporary humanist intellectuals in the fifteenth century had used this
 word. History, according to Poliziano, is a narrative description used in
 different forms of writing, either literary (fabulous) or what we can call
 scientific (trustworthy). Interestingly, some literary forms are based on
 the solidity of truth; here he includes the ancient philosophical literature.
 This point is crucial, since Poliziano is clearly developing a new notion
 of philosophical literature thanks to which this textual corpus becomes a
 legitimate object for philological scrutiny, and it also allows someone like
 Poliziano, with his literary formation and expertise, to teach philosophy.
 This notion stands in sharp contrast to contemporary institutional divi
 sions and practices, as we can see from the angry reactions toward Poli
 ziano and his initiative to teach Aristotle in the University of Florence.
 According to Poliziano, scientific history includes such fields as geo
 graphical and chronological narratives as well as "history" in the classi
 cal sense: investigation of natural and other matters, and also political
 analysis.
 The other parts of rational philosophy are dialectic, rhetoric, and
 poetry. Since Poliziano's account of rhetoric has been studied in some
 detail,41 and since the main theme of the present study is Poliziano and
 philosophy, let us turn our attention to dialectic. According to Poliziano,
 the Latin term dialectica was first presented by Varro, who divided this
 discipline into six rules (normae) studied by dialectic: on logical terms
 and explanatory concepts (de loquendo), on grammatical terms and parts
 of speech and sentences (de eloquendo), on proposition (de proloquendo,
 the Stoic axioma), on different kinds of propositions (de proloquiorum
 summa), on judgment (de iudicando), and on these matters that should
 be presented in speech (de his quae dicenda sunt).42 This basic division
 Aesopeis fabulis, aut ex veri soliditate, quam aut per turpia contexitur, ut in qui
 busdam poeticis figmentis, aut pio tegitur velamine, quod solum genus philosophi
 veteres admiserunt. Ad fidem historia de locis est, ut geographia, vel de temporibus
 ut chronice, vel de natura ut animalium, plantaruni, vel de gestis rebus ut annales,
 historiaeque ceterae: quarum elementa sunt personae, causae, locus, tempus, modus,
 instrumentum, materia, res. Stilus in historia fusus et continuus, non perihodicus,
 nisi cum prosopopoeias asciscit in contionibus."
 41 Wesseling, "Poliziano and Ancient Rhetoric: Theory and Practice" (n. 21 above).
 42 Poliziano, Omnia opera (n. 6 above), Z5r-v: "Dialecticam prius latinitate dona
 vit Marcus Varro, quam sex normis utitur. Et enim de loquendo, de eloquendo, de
 proloquendo, de proloquiorum summa, de iudicando, de his quae dicenda sunt quae
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 is followed by subdivisions of each of the six basic rules.43 The whole
 passage is taken mainly from Martianus Capella's De nuptiis IV, 335-43,
 with some variations, a fact that associates Poliziano with the medieval
 encyclopedic culture, which adapted Martianus Capella's text and turned
 it into a popular textbook during the Middle Ages.
 The third and last kind of human doctrine discussed by Poliziano in
 the Panepistemon, which contains an admixture of inspired and acquired
 elements, is divination or, in a Christian context, prophecy.44 Following
 Chrysostom, Poliziano mentions five kinds of prophecies.45 It is inter
 esting and unusual that Poliziano regards prophecy also as "acquired,"
 while theology is completely "inspired." Under "natural prophecy" we
 find also "frenzy" (furor) and a reference to Plato and the four kinds of
 frenzy,46 which were so important to Ficino, mainly in his 1469 commen
 tary on Plato's Symposium. The "acquired" element in prophecy becomes
 clearer in the discussion of "artificial prophecy." Here Poliziano men
 tions doctors, advisors, and governors, who make use of the art of dream
 interpreters as a kind of practical prophecy, which is closer to art.47 The
 Panepistemon ends with a very critical account of magic, the last kind of
 prophecy.48
 In his Praeledio de dialectica, Poliziano presents a distinction between
 two different meanings of the term "dialectic."49 While in the exposition
 rit." It is beyond the scope of the present article to deal with the complex blend of
 Aristotelian and Stoic logic found in Martianus Capella. It is enough to point out
 that Poliziano in this case does not seem to be aware of these very different tradi
 tions reflected in his source.
 43 Ibid., Z5v.
 44 See n. 16 above.
 45 Ibid., Z6v: "Reliqua divinatio est, quae prophetia quoque dicitur a nostris. Haec
 (ut ait sacer Chrysostomus) aut spiritalis, aut naturalis, aut artificiosa, aut popularis,
 aut damnata est et profana."
 46 Ibid.
 4' Ibid.: "Onirocriticon artificiosa est qua medici, qua consiliarii, qua gubernatores
 utuntur. Nam et medici morborum principia, momenta, finesque praesciscunt, et
 consiliarii, quid expediat in posterum coniectant, et gubernatores ventorum tempes
 tatumque praevident varietates."
 48 Ibid.: "Tum ilia quoque pars damnata in primis, quae vel malos genios consulit,
 vel deos evocat manis, cuique magicae nomen fecimus . . . multaque id genus alia
 vana prorsus, et deridicula quaeque iam merito silentii nos admonent."
 49 Poliziano, Opera omnia (Lyon, 1546), 174-78. This rather short but dense text
 "has never . . . been correctly interpreted," according to Jonathan Hunt, Politian
 and Scholastic Logic: An Unknown Dialogue by a Dominican Friar (Città di Castello,
 1995), 27 (part of the introduction to the critical edition). This interesting account
 by Poliziano of dialectic, logic, and philosophy as a whole reflects his complex and
 more mature attitude to these disciplines and to scholastic philosophy, beyond his
 well-known attacks. One good example of such an attack is cited by Hunt, at 26n62
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 of the first meaning dialectic is regarded as the greatest art and the pur
 est part of philosophy, it is the second meaning that attracts Poliziano:
 We are dealing here with dialectic: but not that one which is said to
 be the one art which is the greatest of all arts, the purest part of phi
 losophy, one that extends itself above all disciplines, gives strength to
 all of them and imposes a ceiling on all of them. But that one (if we
 are to trust Plotinus, the greatest of Platonists) is preferable, by means
 of which we can speak of anything with certain reasoning, that it is,
 in what it differs from something else, with what it is in agreement, or
 where anything is, is it what it is, how many are there that exist, how
 many, on the contrary, that do not exist, and are thus different from
 those that exist. This dialectic also discusses the good and that which is
 not good, deals with all things that fall under the good and with those
 that fall under that which is the opposite of good.50
 in his introduction. The basic facts concerning the date (October 1491, the beginning
 of the academic year 1491-92) and circumstances (introductory lecture to Poliziano's
 first course on logic) of the writing of the Praelectio de dialectica can be found in
 Verde, Lo studio fiorentino (La vita universitaria), 3:1043-45. And see also the gen
 eral account in Vittore Branca, Poliziano e I'umanesimo delta parola (Turin, 1983),
 73-78. For the exact dating of the text and an account of the contents of Poliziano's
 courses on Aristotelian logic see AI Wolters, "Poliziano as a Translator of Plotinus,"
 Renaissance Quarterly 40 (1987): 452-64, especially 463-64. For Hunt's speculations
 concerning this text see Politian and Scholastic Logic, 27-28. See also Hunt's general
 discussion of Poliziano and scholasticism, with further references to modern schol
 arly literature, on 23-33. Hunt's approach clearly prioritizes the humanists over the
 scholastics, as can be seen from the fact that the name of Francesco di Tommaso,
 the author of De negocio logico, is not even mentioned in the title of this critical
 edition of his text while the name of the dedicatee Poliziano is mentioned. (This
 reflects an overall attitude: the whole discussion and scholarly attention focused on
 Francesco di Tommaso, including the preparation of a critical edition of his text, is
 only justified by its relation to Poliziano!) Some remarks on the relations between
 the scholastic thinkers and the studia humanitatis (18), or on the dialogue form (21),
 reveal Hunt's limited understanding of some key features of Renaissance scholastic
 thinkers. In this respect Hunt reflects what is still quite a common perspective in
 Renaissance studies. I shall therefore offer a different interpretation of Poliziano's
 Praelectio de dialectica from the one presented by Hunt on 28-32. For the best previ
 ous attempt to deal with issues concerning Poliziano and dialectic see Cesare Vasoli,
 La dialeltica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo: "Invenzione" e "Metodo" nella cultura del XV
 e XVI secolo (Milan, 1968; repr., Naples, 2007), 183-203.
 50 Ibid., 174-75: "Dialectica nobis in manibus, non ilia quidem, quae ars una
 omnium artium maxima dicitur, eademque purissima philosophiae pars est, quaeque
 se supra disciplinas omnes explicat, omnibus vires accommodat, omnibus fastigium
 imponit. Ilia enim (si Plotino credimus Platonicorum summo) praestat, ut ratione
 quadam de quovis dicere possimus, quod sit, quo différât ab alio, in quo conveniat,
 aut ubi quidque sit, an sit quod est, quot sint quae sunt, quot rursus quae non sunt,
 alia scilicet ab iis, quae sunt. Haec et de bono disputât, et de eo, quod bonum non
 est, omniaque pertractat, quaeque sub bono sunt, quaeque sub eo, quod contrarium
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 The first meaning of dialectic, which never searches anything beyond
 itself, is called "logic" and deals with propositions, syllogisms, and theo
 rems.51 The second meaning of dialectic does not deal with words (literae)
 but rather with the truth (Veritas) and with the cognitive movements of
 the soul (animi cogniti motus). It examines all these matters, but it avoids
 the filth of matter (materiae sordes reformidans), allowing logic to occupy
 itself with these material things.52 This dialectic has been the subject of
 debates among philosophers: some regarded it as a part of philosophy,
 others as an instrument, or, like Boethius, as both.53
 The Platonic dialectic, Poliziano contends, may appear to some to be
 very different and perhaps also more difficult.54 But the subject of Poliz
 iano's course is Aristotelian logic, and so, while answering the rhetorical
 question of who are his teachers in this field, he mentions "his teachers"
 in the Peripatetic school: Theophrastus, Alexander, Themistius, Ammo
 nius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. These ancient Greek commentators on
 Aristotle are followed now (nunc) by Walter Burley, Herveus Natalis,
 bono." In the passage between "ut ratione quadam" and "contrarium bono," Poliz
 iano is rendering in Latin parts of the Greek parts of Plotinus's account of dialectic
 found in Enneads I, 3, 4, and 5, as has been shown in Wolters, "Poliziano as a Trans
 lator of Plotinus." For the above cited passage see Plotinus, Enneads I, 3, 4 (2-7).
 51 Ibid., 175: "ubi vero quieta, nihil iam quaerit ultra, sed in se ipsa considens,
 etiam, quaeque logica disciplina vocatur, inter propositiones, ratiocinationesque suas,
 interque régulas, et theoremata agitantem." See Wolters's remarks on this passage in
 "Poliziano as a Translator of Plotinus," 458-59, where he points out some grammati
 cal problems including a lacuna before "interque."
 52 Ibid.: "Nec enim ipsa ilia talibus, tamque minutis vacat, sicut neque literis, sed
 veritate perspecta, atque animi cognitis motibus, et haec ipsa plane pervidet, sed
 materiae sordes reformidans, volutare in eis logicam sinit." Compare with Plotinus,
 Enneads I, 3, 5 (17-19), and see Wolters, "Poliziano as a Translator of Plotinus," 458.
 3,! Ibid.: "Quae tamen quoniam similitudine quapiam dialecticam repraesentat,
 nata inde contentio inter philosophos est, philosophiaene pars, an instrumentum dia
 lectica sit, an (quod Boetius existimavit) utrumque." Compare Plotinus, Enneads I,
 3, 5 (8-10): (])iX0<70<|>îa to TipucoTarov; Y] xauxov <)>!.Xo<io(j>ia xal SiaXsxTtxV]; 7)
 <[>t.X0<T0<|)îaç [xépoç to xifxiov. où yàp Sr) olt)teov Öpyavov touto slvat toG <f>tXoa6<{>ou.
 Plotinus's point here is that Aristotelian logic is related to philosophy only as far
 as it is connected to reality. For some discussions of Boethius's logic see, e.g., Sten
 Ebbesen, "The Aristotelian Commentator," in The Cambridge Companion to Boethius,
 ed. John Marenbon (Cambridge, 2009), 34-55; Taki Suto, Boethius on Mind, Gram
 mar and Logic: A Study of Boethius' Commentaries on Peri Hermeneias (Leiden, 2012);
 Dimitrios Nikitas, "Exemplum logicum Boethii: Beception and Benewal," in Greek into
 Latin from Antiquity until the Nineteenth Century, ed. John Glucker and Charles Bur
 nett (London, 2012), 131-44.
 54 Ibid.: "Verum Platonica ista remota nimis, nimisque etiam fortasis ardua qui
 busdam videri poterit."
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 William Ockham, William Heytesbury, and Ralph Strode.55 Beyond the
 ironic tone of Poliziano here, deliberately contrasting the ancient Greek
 commentators (whom he highly esteemed in matters of both style and
 contents) with some "obscure" (according to Poliziano's standards) and
 difficult fourteenth-century scholastic thinkers, we also have here an
 important account of the status of several outstanding representatives of
 the via moderna in Italy by the end of the fifteenth century.56
 In his adolescence, Poliziano tells us, he was taught dialectic by some
 hardly obscure teachers of philosophy, some of whom did not know either
 Greek or Latin letters, and so they defiled the purity of Aristotle's books
 while causing him to laugh or making him angry.57 The few teachers who
 knew Greek were dependent on rare volumes of these commentators that
 55 Ibid., 176: "Et ego igitur, si ex me quaeratis, qui mihi praeceptores in Peripa
 teticorum fuerint scolis, strues vobis monstrare librarias potero, ubi Theophrastos,
 Alexandres, Themistios, Hammonios, Simplicios, Philoponos, aliosque praeterea ex
 Aristotelis familia numerabitis, quorum nunc in locum (si diis placet) Burleus [Wal
 ter Burley], Erueus [Herveus Natalis], Occan [William Ockham], Tisperus, Antis
 berus [William Heytesbury], Strodusque [Ralph Strode] succedunt." It is important
 to mention here a dramatic shift from Averroës to Themistius and Simplicius as the
 best interpreters of Aristotle in both Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo during the
 1490s. On this see Edward P. Mahoney, "Philosophy and Science in Nicoletto Vernia
 and Agostino Nifo," in Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance (Aldershot, 2000),
 chap. 1.
 06 On this see Carlo Dionisotti, "Ermolao Barbaro e la fortuna di Suiseth," in
 Medioevo e Rinascimento: Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi (Florence, 1955), 1:217-53.
 57 Poliziano, Opera omnia, 176: "Et quidem ego adulescens doctoribus quibus
 dam, nec iis quidem obscuris philosophiae, dialecticaeque operam dabam, quorum
 alii Graecarum nostrarumque iuxta ignari literarum, ita oninem Aristotelis librorum
 puritatem dira quadam morositatis illuvie foedabant, ut risum mihi aliquando, inter
 dum etiam stomachum moverent." I cannot accept Hunt's speculations on the mean
 ing of adulescens here and his conclusion in Hunt, Politian and Scholastic Logic, 32:
 "Politian is using adulescens in the wider sense allowed by classical Latin, meaning
 a young man roughly between the ages of fifteen and thirty; and it is difficult to
 avoid the conclusion that he is deliberately exploiting the ambiguity of the word to
 distance himself from his debt to scholasticism, even as he avows it." This human
 ist theme of the purity of the Aristotelian texts, or their sweetness, which was cor
 rupted by ignorant scholastic philosophers and medieval translators, found in our
 sources at least since the days of Petrarch (e.g., De sui ipsius et multorum ignoran
 tia, in Invectives, ed. and trans. David Marsh [Cambridge, MA, 2003], 232), probably
 comes, when it refers to the original texts of Aristotle, from an uncritical reading of
 Cicero (e.g., De oratore 1, 49), who praises Aristotle's style while referring to Aris
 totle's "exoteric" works (most of them now lost) such as his dialogues, and not to
 his "acroamatic" writings, which, after their publication in the first century BCE,
 slowly became one of the basic textual, philosophical, and scientific foundations for
 centuries in the Latin West.
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 Poliziano could use thanks to Lorenzo de' Medici's generosity.58 Since the
 innovations of these teachers were all derived from these commentaries,
 Poliziano was gladly attaching himself to those leading Greek commenta
 tors, whose footsteps showed the way even to the ancestral temple of philos
 ophy.59 He would pursue this way toward the Mistress (domina), but without
 conciliating the handmaids that are called by us the liberal arts.60 This state
 ment already aims at putting philosophy (or at least this kind of Platonic
 dialectic) on a higher level than liberales artes. Poliziano admits that he is
 making good use of these liberal arts to this very day through his intimate
 familiarity with them and that he would consider them useful, mainly for
 training one's intellect, but not for dominating it.61 It is interesting to notice
 how he determines the relations between the liberal arts and philosophy:
 For although [the liberal arts] do not teach philosophy, yet they should
 be regarded [as disciplines] that create a place [for perceiving philoso
 phy], and if they do not lead [toward philosophy], yet they certainly
 bring one closer [to philosophy]: wherefore indeed I would hardly deny
 also their achievement through which, indeed, I sometimes would recline
 beside the tables of the lady [philosophy], from whose wine-bowl I drink
 to you at this very moment.62
 58 Ibid., 176-77. On this see E. B. Fryde, Greek Manuscripts in the Private Library
 of the Medici, 1469-1510 (Aberystwyth, 1996).
 59 Ibid., 177: "Quocirca cum ne ipsi quidem quiquam nisi (quod dicitur) ex com
 mentario saperent, libenter ego quoque ad illos adiunxi me duces, quorum trita ves
 tigiis ad usque lares philosophiae semita patebat."
 60 Ibid.: "Sed cum ad ipsam quoque dominam affectarem viam, nequaquam pos
 trema fuit cura etiam eius mihi ancillas et pedissequas conciliandi, quae liberales
 a nostris artes appellantur." Compare this attitude with the one we find in Pico's
 letter to Andrea Corneo (1486), where he defends philosophy from its bad image as
 a discipline of no value unless it can lead to an active political life; he also regrets
 the expectation that future leaders should only have a taste of philosophy for their
 general education, or for the sake of showing off their knowledge. Thus he is not
 willing to turn philosophical learning into some temporary stage during the training
 of an educated man, a view of philosophy implied in Corneo's letter. See Pico, Opera
 omnia (Basel, 1557; repr., Hildesheim, 1969), 376-79, e.g., 377: "Adhortaris me tu
 ad actuosam vitam et civilem, frustra me et in ignominiam quasi, ac contumeliam
 tarn diu philosophatum dicens, nisi tandem in agendarum tractandarumque rerum
 palaestra desudem. Et equidem mi Andrea oleum operamque meorum studiorum per
 didissem, si ita essem nunc animatus, ut hac tibi parte accedere et assentiri possem.
 Exitialis haec ilia est et monstrosa persuasio, quae hominum mentes invasit, aut non
 esse philosophiae studia viris principibus attingenda, aut summis labiis ad pompam
 potius ingenii, quam animi cultum vel ociose etiam delibenda."
 61 Ibid.: "Earum igitur me scitis ad hanc usque diem familiaritate intima esse usum,
 quoniam non inutiles esse audieram, praesertim si praepararent ingenium, non deti
 nerent."
 62 Ibid.: "Nam si philosophiam non docent, ipsae mox tamen percipiendae locum
 parant, si non perducunt, ac certe expediunt: quapropter minime equidem negaverim
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 And indeed, Poliziano mentions some early episodes in his life when he
 was involved in scholastic disputations, pointing out that he was praised
 for his performances. He also describes some philosophical books that he
 interpreted either publicly or privately for some students.63
 Poliziano refers next to the tension between words and actions: why
 do we need words when we are evaluated by our actions, he asks. Fol
 lowing Epictetus, he presents an analogy between sheep, which do not
 brag about the large amount of grass they have eaten but rather offer
 their shepherd their milk and wool, and the philosopher, who ought not
 to make long speeches about the efforts he has invested in his studies
 but rather offer us the fruits of his learning.64 Poliziano makes it very
 clear that this is what he believes that he, too, should do (quod et nobis
 erit, opinor, faciendum): action and doctrine are more precious for the
 philosopher than words and declarations (interestingly, this is also the
 preference and criterion for good preachers in medieval culture, and so
 we have here yet another analogy between the preacher or the theolo
 gian, and the philosopher). The question, as far as Poliziano is concerned,
 is only about the quality of these doctrines, and even here one has to be
 cautious about what one does draw out of Greek and Roman sources:
 Therefore, lend me your ears and minds, Florentine youth, to draw with
 me the elements of true philosophy, not from the muddy cisterns of
 the barbarians, but from the perspicuous fountains of the Greeks and
 Romans. We should also take care and avoid a situation where we draw
 anything from this source that we would not be able to defend with rea
 son or authority.65
 While clearly regarding classical philosophy as superior to medieval
 philosophy and identifying it with "true philosophy," Poliziano still
 harum quoque beneficio factum, ut ipsis aliquando dominae mensis accubuerim, de
 cuius videlicet cratera vobis in praesentia propino."
 Ibid.: "Nec tarnen haec prima nostra sunt rudimenta iuvenes: nam et in
 palaestram quandoque disputationis, non sine laude descendimus, et philosophiae
 libros nonnullos vel publice vobis (quod scitis) vel privatim studiosis aliquot homi
 nibus enarravimus."
 64 Ibid.: "Denique quid verbis opus est? spectemur agendo: ut enim oves, quod
 Stoicus inquit Epictetus, in pascua dimissae, nequaquam illae quidem apud pastorem
 gloriantur, plurimo se pastas gramine, sed lac ei potius, vellusque praebent; ita phi
 losophus minime quidem praedicare ipsa debet, quantum in studiis desudaverit, sed
 ipsam suae doctrinae frugem proferre in medium, quod et nobis erit, opinor, facien
 dum."
 65 Ibid., 177-78: "Quare ades auribus, atque animis Florentina iuventus, ac verae
 philosophiae primordia, non iam de lutosis Barbarorum lacubus, sed de Graecorum
 Latinorumque nitidis fontibus hauri mecum. Curae autem nobis erit, ne quid hue
 afferatur, quod non vel ratione tueri, vel autoritate possimus."
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 thinks that it should be defended by using what are, in fact, the same
 philosophical practices used by the "barbarians" (i.e., the scholastics):
 reasons and authorities. Poliziano seems here quite committed to philoso
 phy in a way that is beyond Kristeller's historical definition of Renais
 sance humanism.66
 In his final words, Poliziano declares that, in the case of this short
 lecture, it is not true that the sharpness of the mind will be blunted by
 excessive verbosity, obscurity of speech, or by the weight of the ques
 tions, thanks to its evident shortness and its free style of discussion.67
 Not all doubts and concerns will be either raised and discussed or dis
 missed, according to Poliziano, in order to exercise "your minds" (vestra
 ingénia) in the most comfortable manner, and not to cause you fatigue.68
 So this short account of dialectic is already itself a kind of a dialectical
 exercise.
 In the Lamia, Poliziano developed further a model for the historian of
 philosophy very different from the models held by contemporary scho
 lastic philosophers. In many respects the Florentine intellectual scene of
 66 Humanism, according to Kristeller, was an important cultural movement, but
 it was focused on a very specific part of culture, basically the linguistic disciplines.
 He saw no relation between the humanists' interest in rhetoric (both in theory and
 in practice), their new attitude to Aristotle and Cicero, their critique of scholasti
 cism, their political activity, and their philosophical viewpoint. See, e.g., Kristeller,
 "Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance," in Studies in Renaissance
 Thought and Letters (Rome, 1956), 553-83, especially 560-74. As the case of Poliz
 iano's attitude to philosophy and logic shows, Poliziano's interest in these disciplines
 began at least around 1480, when the Dominican Francesco di Tommaso dedicated
 to him his dialogue De negocio logico, which seems to reflect previous encounters
 and common interest in scholastic logic. This means that Poliziano's attraction to
 philosophy and logic is not only the result of Pico's influence in the late 1480s, nor
 is it some very late development in his intellectual interests that occurred in his
 last years, during the early 1490s. This interest can be dated at least more than a
 decade before Poliziano's death in 1494. A general discussion of these issues can be
 found in Hunt, Politian and Scholastic Logic, 23-33. For a more adequate perspec
 tive on the relations between the humanists and philosophy see Jill Kraye, "Phi
 lologists and Philosophers," in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism,
 ed. eadem (Cambridge, 1996), 142-60. For a detailed account of Poliziano's Platonic
 interpretation of Epictetus's Enchiridion see eadem, "L'interprétation platonicienne
 de Y Enchiridion d'Epictète proposée par Politien: Philologie et philosophie dans la
 Florence du XVème siècle, à la fin des années 70," in Pensé entre les lignes: Philologie
 et philosophie au Quattrocento, ed. F. Mariani Zini (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2001), 161-77.
 6/ Poliziano, Opera omnia (n. 49 above), 178: "Nec vero verbositate nimia, aut
 perplexitate orationis, aut quaestionum molibus vestrae mentis acies retundetur.
 Etenim perspicua brevitas, atque expeditus erit nostrae orationis cursus."
 68 Ibid.: "Dubitationes autem nec omnes, nec ubique aut interponemus, aut omit
 temus, sicut vestra quam commodissime exerceantur ingénia, non fatigentur."
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 the last decades of the Quattrocento anticipated much later debates con
 cerning different approaches to philosophy.69 Poliziano's model was an
 exclusive one (as against both Ficino's and Pico's inclusive models), giv
 ing precedence to the ancient Greek and Roman sources over everything
 else, and in fact dismissing any other source. The image of the lamia
 that he uses to describe his scholastic opponents (probably some scholas
 tic-Aristotelian colleagues in the Studio Fiorentino or any other scholas
 tic philosophers, teachers in the private studia of the different religious
 orders, etc.)70 is that of bloodthirsty creatures with removable eyes (oculi
 exemptiles) who put their eyes on like eyeglasses when they are walking
 outside, putting them away and becoming blind while being at home.
 This limited, manipulative, and rather inconsistent use of the eyes and
 of the sense of seeing is clearly the way, according to Poliziano, scholas
 tic philosophers are using their eyes, i.e., their minds, while discussing
 philosophical matters: a limited, manipulative, and inconsistent way of
 philosophizing.71
 69 The perception of Poliziano's model of doing philosophy and his historical and
 philological approach to philosophical texts presented here is different from the one
 found in Celenza, "Poliziano's Lamia in Context" (n. 3 above), 28. While Poliziano
 certainly does not represent anything close to a "formal history of philosophy" in
 the spirit of Brucker, he still presents something more systematic than "a dialogi
 cal reflection on the search for wisdom." On this see also idem, "What Counted as
 Philosophy in the Italian Renaissance? The History of Philosophy, the History of
 Science, and Styles of Life," Critical Inquiry 39 (2013): 367-401.
 70 This is yet another example of the need for a detailed reconstruction of the
 Florentine scholastic discourse in the last decades of the fifteenth century. The
 phrase "vecchi autori scolastici" used by Vasoli in his La dialettica e la retorica
 dell'Umanesimo (n. 49 above), 190, to describe those possible opponents against
 whom Poliziano was reacting is not only too general but also a bit pejorative. I
 could not find any evidence to support Vasoli's speculation, ibid., that Landino or
 Ficino are also objects of Poliziano's reaction in the Lamia. We should not forget,
 however, that Poliziano had some very good relations with Francesco di Tommaso
 and probably also with other scholastic philosophers.
 71 For Poliziano's text see Angelo Poliziano, Lamia: Praelectio in priora Aristotelis
 analytica, ed. Ari Wesseling (Leiden, 1986); see also the Latin text (with some minor
 variations from Wesseling's edition) with annotated English translation, in Angelo
 Poliziano's Lamia, ed. and trans. Christopher Celenza (Leiden, 2010), 191-253. I shall
 refer here to this edition. For Poliziano's description of the lamia see 194-98; for the
 analogy between seeing and philosophizing see 218-20. Igor Candido in "The Role
 of the Philosopher in Late Quattrocento Florence; Poliziano's Lamia and the Leg
 acy of the Pico-Barbaro Epistolary Controversy," in Angelo Poliziano's Lamia, ed.
 Celenza, 95-129, justly cites a passage from Plato's Timaeus as one possible source
 for this well-known analogy (110), but his overall interpretation of the importance
 of Poliziano's Lamia relies too heavily on unhelpful phrases such as "Socratic irony"
 and "ironic method" (99), or "the Socratic doctrine of inner knowledge" (114), and
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 The analogy between the eyes and the mind, seeing and thinking, a
 standard analogy in the philosophical tradition known at least since the
 Platonic dialogues and revived, like so many other classical analogies and
 themes, during the fifteenth century, becomes evident in a very signifi
 cant passage in the Lamia:
 Since if it is not permissible to philosophize, it is not permissible to live
 according to the virtue of the soul. But just as we are alive thanks to
 the soul, so we live well thanks to the virtue of the soul; as for instance,
 just as we see through the eyes, so we see well through the virtue of
 the eyes. Therefore, the one who does not want to live well should not
 philosophize. The one who wants to live dishonorably should not pursue
 philosophy.72
 There are many obvious reminiscences in this passage, e.g., to Plato's
 Apology (38a5-6: "the unexamined life is not worth living") and to Aris
 totle's opening sentence of the Metaphysics (980al), concerning the natu
 ral desire of all human beings "to know," as well as the general emphasis
 on the "theoretical life" and its connection to human happiness. These
 arguments by Poliziano come at the beginning of his response to several
 critiques of philosophy that were presented earlier, and they are part
 of Poliziano's defense of the proper way of philosophizing. It is impor
 tant not to disregard Poliziano's use of the role of the will here: the way
 of living is clearly determined by a free-willing agent who should know
 that philosophizing is strongly related to living in accordance with the
 virtue of the soul. Following a certain old and broad-shouldered Athe
 nian ("Atheniensis quidam senex altis humeris"), that is, Plato, Poliziano
 emphasizes the importance of dialectic as the necessary art of distinguish
 ing the true from the false, while dismissing rhetoric and regarding it as
 meddlesome vanity, an art that is focused on pretending and deceiving
 instead of pursuing the truth.73 On the same lines, philosophy does not
 even on "complex irony," which he takes from Gregory Vlastos (116). For this rea
 son he misses, for instance, the important differences between Poliziano's and Pico's
 approaches (122).
 72 Poliziano, Lamia, 218-20: "Quod si philosophandum non est, secundum animi
 virtutem vivendum non est. At sicut animo vivimus, ita animi virtute bene vivimus,
 quemadmodum sicuti oculis videmus, ita oculorum virtute bene videmus. Qui bene
 vivere igitur non vult, is ne philosophetur; qui turpiter vivere vult, is philosophiam
 ne sectetur."
 '3 Ibid., 208: "Illam tamen in primis necessariam esse artem qua verum a falso
 dignoscitur, qua mendacium refutatur, sicuti e diverso, esse occupatissimam vani
 tatem quae artificium hoc non sequitur sed simulât, verumque colorem fuco menti
 tur." The reference to Plato appears earlier, at 206: "Sed extitit Atheniensis quidam
 senex altis eminens humeris. . . This is a hint to an ancient popular etymology of
 Plaon, "broad-shouldered."
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 have to do anything, only devote itself to contemplation.74 What we seem
 to have here is a very Aristotelian perspective on philosophy, identify
 ing the role of "first philosophy" with philosophy as a whole. This is a
 very different perspective from what is usually regarded as the "human
 ist approach to philosophy," which is associated with moral and mainly
 civic and political issues. The truth of the matter is that once the histori
 cal and philological methods have come to be used in philosophy, every
 part of it becomes a subject of scholarly scrutiny, and in turn this scru
 tiny becomes part of philosophical discourse. This was possible thanks to
 a rather new notion of a "philosophical literature" (as we have seen in
 Poliziano's definition of history found in the Panepistemon), contextual
 izing philosophical prose and treating it as part of ancient literature in
 the broad sense.
 Poliziano continues with this Aristotelian line of argumentation, com
 pletely understandable in an introductory lecture for a course on the
 Prior Analytics, relating philosophy to happiness (félicitas) and assigning
 to philosophy the role of curing the soul.75 He seems truly committed
 to philosophy in a way that is beyond mere stylistic and philological
 concerns.76 The fact that Poliziano does not wish to be called a philos
 opher does not mean that he regarded himself as a philologist "only,"
 but should rather suggest a completely different approach to philosophy
 from the one used by most scholastic philosophers. In other words, Poliz
 iano cannot be regarded (by himself or others) as a philosopher simply
 because this title was commonly identical at that time to that of scholas
 tic philosophers of some sort, while he tried to establish a new identity:
 Now indeed I truly hear and understand what you say, what you mean,
 good Lamias. But on the other hand you, on your part, listen also to me
 for a moment, if you have time. I admit that I am an interpreter of Aris
 totle. It is beside the point to determine how capable [I am]; I just declare
 that I am certainly an interpreter, not a philosopher. For I would not think
 that if I am an interpreter of a king, because of this I am also a king.77
 74 Ibid., 228: "At nihil agit philosophia, tantum contemplationi vacat."
 75 Ibid., 220: "Mihi autem videtur et illud: qui philosophari nolit etiam felix esse
 nolle"; "profecto ut felices efficiamur philosophandum est"; "Ut autem medicina cor
 pus, ita animum curat philosophia."
 76 Ibid., 222: "Sed quae sola iudicium teneat rectum, quaeque ratione ipsa utatur
 atque universum bonum contempletur, ea certe vel uti vel imperare omnibus sua
 pte natura potest. Talis autem praeter philosophiam nulla omnino est. Cur igitur
 pudeat philosophari?" Poliziano's remarks here seem more than the words of "the
 amateur philosopher, the accomplished Latinist and the imaginative poet"; see Wolt
 ers, "Poliziano as a Translator of Plotinus" (n. 49 above), 460.
 77 Ibid., 240: "Audio equidem nunc vero et intellego quid dicatis, quid sentia
 tis, bonae Lamiae. Sed vicissim vos quoque audite me parumper, si vacat. Ego me
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 This is clearly one of the early accounts of the importance of the place
 of the interpreter of philosophical texts, including a distinction between
 philosophers and interpreters. The remark in the last sentence is directed
 against the arrogance of scholastic philosophers who are unaware that
 the fact that they are writing commentaries on Aristotelian texts does
 not yet turn them into Aristotles. Moreover, the use of scholastic methods
 will probably make many of them bad interpreters.
 We have seen that Poliziano's commitment to philosophy is a natural
 part of his new scholarly approach to philosophy.78 This new approach
 also implies regarding philosophy as an end in itself and not as an instru
 ment for making profit or gaining anything, as well as realizing that phi
 losophy reflects human interiority and an internal need; in this regard it
 reflects an absolute institutional freedom:
 Let also this be an argument for this ease: that philosophy quickly
 reaches its full growth even without any price required. And how many
 ingenious people are there whose prayers would not include the wish for
 a free time to philosophize? But this indeed would not happen if to phi
 losophize would be regarded more as a task than as a pleasure. How
 come that we can practice this study and always meditate without the
 need for any instruments from outside, that there is no place unsuitable
 for it? For wherever you are the truth is at hand.79
 Poliziano is describing here the notion of philosophical freedom, or the
 freedom to pursue the truth everywhere and without any pragmatic or
 economic calculation, which is used in this context as an argument against
 "formal" philosophers, the men of the schools who have very specific
 places (and methods) for philosophizing: the studia and the universities.
 Aristotelis profiteor interpretem. Quam idoneum non attinet dicere, sed certe inter
 preter« profiteor, philosophum non profiteor. Nec enim si regis quoque essem inter
 pres, regem me esse ob id putarem." This passage, without the last sentence, is also
 cited and discussed in Vasoli, La dialeltica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo (n. 49 above),
 191-92.
 78 On this issue see the important but inconclusive remarks in Vasoli, La dialeltica
 e la retorica dell'Umanesimo, 202-3. See also the remarks on Poliziano's philological
 method and its relation to ethics and moral issues in Revilo P. Oliver, "Politian's
 Translation of the Enchiridion," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philo
 logical Association 89 (1958): 185-217, at 203-7.
 '9 Poliziano, Lamia, 222: "Sit huius argumentum facilitatis et illud: quod ad maxi
 mum incrementuin brevi pervenit philosophia nulla etiam proposita mercede. Et
 quotus est ingeniosorum cui non otium sit in votis ut philosophari liceat? Hoc autem
 profecto non fieret, si philosophari labor ac non potius voluptas esset. Quid quod
 exercere id Studium semper meditarique possumus, ut quod nullis extrinsecus indi
 geat instrumentis, ut cui nullus incongruens sit locus? Ubi ubi enim fueris, praesto
 erit Veritas." I prefer to translate in this polemical context the word labor as "task"
 (and almost as a job) rather than Celenza's "labor" (ibid., 223).
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 In an elegant variation on a standard scholastic argument concern
 ing the connection between loving and knowing (i.e., one must know an
 object in order to be able to love it), Poliziano provides his readers with
 an explanation for the common human fear of death: lack of knowledge
 and understanding.80 But knowing and understanding are the unique fea
 tures of philosophy, and so, Poliziano concludes, only philosophy should
 be regarded in this life as the proper discipline or activity that is for us
 just like a haven where we should rest.81 It is clear here that Poliziano is
 80 Poliziano, Lamia, 224-26: "Cur autem et mortem prope omnes expavescimus?
 Quoniam, puto, cuique terribile quod ignoratur, ut quod obscurum, quod tenebri
 cosum est, sicuti contra amabile quod intellegitur, ut quod apertum, quod illustre
 est." For this argument in three contemporary thinkers see, e.g., Alamanno Donati,
 "De intellectus voluntatisque excellentia," ed. Lambertus Borghi, Bibliofilia 42 (1940):
 108-15, especially 109: "Id proculdubio quod sibi nequaquam sufficere valet igno
 bilius est et imperfectius eo quod sibi sufficit. Ex quo perfectissimum in natura dici
 tur quod nihilo indiget. Is est intellectus, qui operationem suam absque voluntate
 utique producit, cum absque ea intelligere possit. Voluntas vero minime, quando
 invisa diligamus, incognita nequaquam." See also Giorgio Benigno Salviati, "Fride
 ricus, De animae regni principe," in P. Zvonimir Cornelius Sojat, OFM, De voluntate
 hominis eiusque praeeminentia et dominatione in anima secundum Georgium Dragisic
 (c. 1448-1520), Studium historico-doctrinale et editio Tractatus: "Fridericus, De animae
 regni principe" (Rome, 1972), 139-219; especially 151: "coexigere aliquid necessario
 et indigere illo, si non sit mutua coexigentia, ignobilius et imperfectius est: unde qui
 nullius indiget, perfectissimus dicitur; sed actus voluntatis poscit et coexigit actum
 intellectus, hic vero non exigit ilium (intelligere namque possumus absque volun
 tate, velle certo non valemus nisi cognoscamus: ferimur enim in ea solum quae prae
 novimus); praeclarior igitur intellectus ipse"; and see also at 191: "Cur igitur homo,
 qui hanc picturam agnoscit, non poterit erga earn elicere amorem, ex quo sequitur
 voluptas? Unde quamvis homo non possit amare incognita, potest tamen diligere
 quoquo modo cognita." As we can see, the context of this argument is the debate
 concerning the will (which is related through its activity to love) and the intellect
 (which is related through its activity to reasoning). For the last example see Vin
 cenzo Bandello da Castelnuovo, "Opusculum," in Le Thomisme et la pensée italienne
 de la renaissance, ed. Kristeller (n. 15 above), 245: "Ad idem respondet S. Thomas
 in quaestionibus De veritate, q. 14, a. 5, ad quintum. Intellectus, inquit, praecedit vo
 luntatem in via receptionis, quia nihil potest velle voluntas nisi id primo in intellects
 recipiatur, ut dicitur in tertio De anima. At voluntas praecedit intellectum in mo
 vendo seu agendo. . . . Praemium autem dicitur per modum receptionis, sed meritum per
 modum actionis. Et inde est quod totum praemium beatificum principaliter ascribitur
 intellectui, unde dei visio dicitur tola merces beatitudinis. . . . Meritum autem princi
 palis caritati attribuitur quae perficit voluntatem quae movet omnes potentias ad
 operandum opera meritoria."
 81 Ibid., 226: "Si igitur quae nota sunt delectant, cur etiam nosse ipsum ac sapere
 non delectet? At id maxime proprium philosophiae est. Aut igitur nihil agendum in
 hac vita, nihil expetendum est, aut in sola philosophia tanquam in portu requiescen
 dum." Compare with the words of Cristoforo Landino from his Praefatio in Tuscula
 nis, written around 1458, in Roberto Cardini, La critica del Landino (Florence, 1973),
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 assigning to philosophy what is traditionally assigned to theology. This is
 a dramatic change from the medieval institutional status of philosophy,
 which was regarded as an important and crucial ingredient taught in the
 arts or medical faculties as a preparation for a career in the three higher
 faculties: law, medicine, and theology.82
 Poliziano continues along this line, and it carries him far beyond Aris
 totelian logic and much closer to the territory of standard theological
 themes, when he declares that human life is nothing but an empty shadow;
 but, instead of some biblical, patristic, or scholastic authorities, he cites
 Pindar on the one hand, and an ancient popular proverb on the other.83 A
 serious consideration of human life, glory, and physical beauty will force
 us, according to Poliziano, to conclude that there is nothing solid and last
 ing in human affairs.84 Can the human soul save the day? Poliziano rejects
 the possibility of separate souls: since the soul is spread out and extended
 ("anima . . . extenta et explicata") in every part of the body, it practically
 shares the same destiny as the body and dies with the body, just like the
 miserable subjects of Mezentius in Virgil's description.85 The only thing in
 human affairs that is worthy (dignum) of pursuit and attention is, accord
 ing to Poliziano (who is citing here Horace and following Iamblichus), our
 soul, a particle of the divine breath ("divinae particula aurae"), and it is
 God who is mind for us ("Deus enim est animus nobis").86 One notices the
 304: "Quam ob rem, si humanas solicitudines atque miserias sola philosophia potest
 pellere, eius saluberrima praecepta diligentissime attendamus illique ceteris post
 habitis negociis incumbamus; cuius quidem, etiam si maximus proponeretur labor,
 summa tarnen rei utilitas omnem difficultatem vincere deberet."
 82 On the institutional status of theology in the Italian universities and in the
 academic life of the Renaissance, see Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renais
 sance (n. 24 above), 353-92. Crucial to this point are Grendler's remarks on 353 that
 subjects like theology, metaphysics, and scripture "remained minor subjects in uni
 versities dominated by arts, medicine, and law."
 83 Poliziano, Lamia, 226: "Subiciamus, quaeso, oculis hominum vitam. Quid ea est
 omnis praeter inanem umbram vel, ut significantius ait Pindarus, umbrae somnium?
 Homo bulla est,' antiquum inquit proverbium."
 84 Ibid.
 85 Ibid., 228: "Nam cum sit anima iuncta agglutinataque corpori ac per omnis
 artus omnisque sensuum quasi meatus extenta et explicata, non alio mihi videtur
 supplicio affecta quam quo Mazentius ille Vergilianus miseros cives suos afficiebat.
 Ita enim de eo canit Poeta noster: 'Mortua quin etiam iungebat corpora vivis, / com
 ponens manibusque manus atque oribus ora, / tormenti genus, et sanie taboque flu
 enti I Complexu in misero, longa sic morte necabat.'" For the reference to Virgil see
 ibid., 229n46.
 86 Ibid.: "Nihil igitur in rebus humanis studio curaque dignum praeter illam quam
 pulchere vocat Horatius 'divinae particulam aurae,' quae ut in hoc caeco rerum tur
 bine tamen vita hominum tuto gubernetur. Deus enim est animus nobis, deus pro
 fecto, sive hoc Euripides primus dicere ausus, sive Hermotimus, sive Anaxagoras."
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 change in Poliziano's terminology here, from anima to animus, and the
 focus on the divine spark in us rather than on the human soul. Describing
 this particle of the divine breath as governing or directing all human life
 ("quae . . . vita hominum tuto gubernetur"), as well as the image of breath
 (aura), has a clear Stoic flavor.87
 It seems that Poliziano's radical and critical approach to texts88 and
 his historical sensitivities stand behind his description of the philoso
 pher (in which he is following Plato and Seneca) as someone who is very
 critical (and thus radical from a social and political point of view) with
 regard to noble origins: a serious historical consideration does not allow
 for a complete distinction between kings and slaves.89 This remark should
 be understood in the context of the well-known Florentine republican
 discourse, which is one of the most intriguing features of the political
 discourse in Florence (but usually not associated with Poliziano), at least
 since the days of Salutati by the end of the fourteenth century.90
 For the references to Horace and Iamblichus see ibid., 229nn47-48. For more sources
 see Lamia, ed. Wesseling (n. 71 above), 83.
 87 In Stoic sources animus is a translation of logos-, see Adler's index to the Stoi
 corum Veterum Fragmenta, collegit Ionnes ab Arnim, Volumen IV, quo indices con
 tinentur, conscripsit Maximiiianus Adler, Lipsiae in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1924
 (and reprints), 91. This logos emerges from the hegemonikon but is not equal to it. In
 this regard Horace's expression reflects just that: our own human animus is a spark
 of the divine pneuma = hegemonikon. One need not assume that Poliziano was fully
 aware of all these Stoic connections.
 88 On this point see Anthony Grafton, "On the Scholarship of Politian and its Con
 text," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 40 (1977): 150-88. And see also
 Michael D. Reeve, "Classical Scholarship," in The Cambridge Companion to Renais
 sance Humanism, ed. Kraye (n. 66 above), 20-46, especially at 29-30.
 89 Poliziano, Lamia, 232-34: "An is non eum deridebit qui se generosissimum putet
 quod avos quinque forte aut sex nobiles numeret et divites? Cum sciat in stem
 mate cuiusvis et serie generis prope innumeros inveniri et servos et barbaros et men
 dicos, nec esse regem quemquam qui non sit e servis natus nec item servum cui
 non origo sint reges. Omnia enim ista, quae distant, longa aetas miscuit." It seems
 that Poliziano is combining here two sources: Plato and Seneca. Compare Seneca
 (probably Poliziano's first source where he found the reference to Plato), Ad Lucil
 ium epistulae morales, ed. L. D. Reynolds (Oxford, 1965), 1:44: "Platon ait [Theaet.
 174e5-175a5] neminem regem non ex servis esse oriundum, neminem servum non ex
 regibus. Omnia ista longa varietas miscuit et sursum deorsum fortuna versavit." See
 also Plato's account (and the manner in which Poliziano modified it): wç yEvvaïéi;
 tiç tu Ta 7KX7i7iou(; tcàouctlouç e^wv à7t0())^vai . . . (174e6-7); . . . ort mxTznutv xal
 rcpoyovtov fJ-uptaSs? sxacrrw yeyova<nv àvapt0[XY)TOi., èv alç 7rXoûat.ot. ical
 y.où ßaatX-Jji; y.cx.1 SoüXoi, ßapßapoi ts xal "EXXyjveç itoXXàxiç jxupîoi. ysyàvaaiv
 ôtcoouv . . . (175a2-5). And see also Lamia, ed. Wesseling, 89.
 90 Compare Poliziano's account of noble origins with the words of his student and
 follower in the Studio fiorentino, Marcello di Virgilio Adriani, who was also the chan
 cellor of the Florentine republic and served in different political positions during
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 Equipped with a new scholarly apparatus, Poliziano's philosopher is
 turned against the "shady wisdom" (umbratilis sapientia) that is described
 in the midst of Poliziano's account of Iamblichus's version of the myth
 of the cave.91 Those fettered in the darkness of the cave are the mob
 (vulgus) and the unlearned (ineruditi), while the philosopher is free from
 chains in the shining light (clara in luce). It is here that we find Poliz
 iano's clear indication that he would like to be a philosopher, if it were
 allowed.92
 the last decade of the fifteenth century and the first two decades of the sixteenth
 century, found in his 1516 funeral oration for Giuliano de'Medici, in John M. McMa
 namon, S.J., "Marketing a Medici Regime: The Funeral Oration of Marcello Virgilio
 Adriani for Giuliano de'Medici (1516)," Renaissance Quarterly 44 (1991): 1-41; see
 29-30: "Dum enim eandem urbem incolentes omnes aequa virtutis suae proportione,
 eadem dignitate et civilitatis honore esse voluistis, dum novae peregrinaeque vir
 tuti aditum ad honores in vobis non precluditis speratisque et alienum et e plebe
 hominem posse inter vos fieri in curia sapientem, in foro facundum, domi utilem,
 foris honestum, bello paceque bonum civein, nec (quod fere ubique fit) nobilitati
 tantum sed virtuti honorum titulos et praemia decernitis, dum acerbissimarum igna
 vae nobilitatis legum vinculis solutos cives vestros esse voluistis licereque omnibus
 quod virtuti suae respondeat confidentius quaerere — nuptias, magistratus, honores,
 clientelas, et imperia — et, ubi virtus sit, paupertatem aliasque Fortunae Naturaeve
 iniurias nihil obesse, et, ne longiores simus, dum licet in consortio et societate reipu
 blicae esse et, quod aequae libertatis est, sortito et invicem annuis magistratibus
 parere atque imperitare, eo incrementi et gloriae res vestra perducta est ut rerum
 gestarum gloriae imperium accesserit et gloriam studiumque eius tanta imperii mer
 ces nunc etiam accendat." McManamon's observation on 4 that "Florence's humanist
 chancellors were committed public servants but cautious ideologues" who "lent their
 academic prestige to a variety of regimes" is crucial here. For some "classic" schol
 arly accounts of these issues with further references, see, e.g., Hans Baron, The Crisis
 of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of
 Classicism and Tyranny (Princeton, NJ, 1966); idem, In Search of Civic Humanism,
 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ, 1988). For a critical evaluation of Baron's thesis see espe
 cially James Hankins, ed., Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections
 (Cambridge, 2000). See also Albert Rabil, Jr., "The Significance of 'Civic Human
 ism' in the Interpretation of the Italian Renaissance," in Renaissance Humanism:
 Foundations, Forms, and Legacy, ed. Albert Rabil, Jr. (Philadelphia, 1988), 1:141-74;
 James Hankins, "The 'Baron Thesis' after Forty Years and Some Recent Studies of
 Leonardo Bruni," Journal of the History of Ideas 56 (1995): 309-38.
 91 Poliziano, Lamia, 234-40; see 238: "Cedo, quid hie volutabit animo? Quid
 faciet? Quoties carcerem caecum, quoties vincula, quoties vere umbratilem sapien
 tiam, recordabitur, equidem puto gratias diis aget magnas, ingentes, quod inde se
 emerserit tandem dolebitque vicem sociorum, quos in tantis reliquerit malis." For
 the source of this version see ibid., 235n55.
 92 Ibid., 240: "Nunc illud tantum admonebo: vinctos in tenebris homines nullos
 esse alios quam vulgus et ineruditos, liberum autem ilium clara in luce et exemptum
 vinculis, hunc esse ipsum philosophum de quo iamdiu loquimur. Atque utinam is ego
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 It is exactly at this point that Poliziano is accused by the Lamias for
 his arrogant behavior and for practically being a charlatan who in the
 last three years has been teaching things that he does not really know
 and understand, things that he is not competent to teach.93 Against this
 accusation, Poliziano declares that he is only an interpreter of philosoph
 ical texts, not a straightforward philosopher.94 He gives as an example
 the names of interpreters of poets who were not themselves poets.95 By
 doing that, Poliziano is pointing out the significance of interpretative
 scholarship, which, since antiquity and all throughout the Middle Ages,
 has had its place beside the works of philosophy or poetry. Moreover,
 Poliziano is presenting a part of the philosophical tradition as a tradi
 tion of philological interpretation, and by doing so he brings it closer to
 philology. He creates a space for philological interpretations that are not
 restricted to specific disciplines but rather are being used as instruments
 in different disciplines.96 These instruments of the philologists are valid
 and useful for any kind of writings (omne scriptorum genus): poetic, his
 torical, rhetorical, philosophical, medical, and legal.97 From a contempo
 rary, twenty-first century perspective, it makes us smile a sardonic smile
 to read Poliziano's complaints regarding fifteenth-century limited appre
 ciation of the philologists, in comparison to their status in antiquity.98
 essem! Non enim tani metuo invidiam crimenque nominis huius ut esse philosophus
 nolim, si liceat."
 93 Ibid.: "Nec ita imperitae aut praeposterae sumus ut philosophiam tibi obiecta
 remus pro crimine. Sed illud indignabamur, tacere te (ne graviore utamur verbo)
 subarroganter, qui triennio iam philosophum te profitearis ac nunquam scilicet ante
 id tempus operam philosophiae dederis. Ob id enim nugatorem quoque te diximus,
 quod ilia diu iam doceas quae nescias, quae non didiceris."
 94 See n. 77 above.
 Ibid.: "Nec apud nos Donatus, puta, et Servius, apud Graecos Aristarchus et
 Zenodotus continuo se poetas profitentur, quoniam quidem poetas interpretentur."
 For the sources here see Lamia, ed. Wesseling, 98.
 96 Ibid., 240-44: "An non Philoponus ille Ammonii discipulus Simpliciique condis
 cipulus idoneus Aristotelis est interpres? At eum nemo philosophum vocat, omnes
 grammaticum. Quid? Non grammaticus etiam Cous ille Xenocritus et Rhodii duo
 Aristocles atque Aristeas et Alexandrini item duo Antigonus ac Didymus et omnium
 celeberrimus idem ille Aristarchus? Qui tamen omnes (ut Erotianus est auctor) Hip
 pocratis interpretati sunt libros, sicuti alii quoque, quos Galenus enumerat. Nec eos
 tamen quisquam medicos esse ob id putat." In this context Celenza is of course right
 in maintaining that the Latin grammaticus should be rendered as "philologist," See
 ibid., 243n60. For the sources here see Lamia, ed. Wesseling, 99.
 9' Ibid., 244: "Grammaticorum enim sunt hae partes, ut omne scriptorum genus,
 poetas, historicos, oratores, philosophos, medicos, iureconsultos excutiant atque enar
 rent." For the sources here see Lamia, ed. Wesseling, 99-101.
 98 Ibid.: "Nostra aetas, parum perita rerum veterum, nimis brevi gyro grammati
 cum sepsit. At apud antiquos olim tantum auctoritatis hie ordo habuit ut censores
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 This is mainly because in Poliziano's times it was the elementary gram
 mar teachers who were called grammatici. Poliziano is aiming at estab
 lishing a distinction (which he supports by using the authority of the
 ancient Greeks and Romans while closely following Suetonius) between
 this group of elementary teachers (who in fact should be called gramma
 tistae or literatores) on the one hand, and the professional men of letters,
 the learned (who in fact are the ones who should be called grammatici or
 litterati)."
 Thus, the only title that Poliziano is asking for himself is that of a
 philologist, a grammaticus in the true and ancient sense of this term.
 But this still entails knowing many things regarding many different dis
 ciplines, without which the philologist will not be able to correct and
 properly comment on the texts he is working on. The point here is that
 philology is always an instrument only; it is not an end in itself, and
 there is no such thing as pure philology. The philologist, just like a cha
 meleon, which changes its colors to suit the different surfaces, must learn
 the details of the disciplines behind each of his texts. But, as Poliziano
 clarifies, working as a philologist on legal or medical texts has not turned
 him into a jurisconsult or a physician.100 One can have the proper schol
 arly and theoretical background without the more technical, formal, and
 practical aspects of a discipline. This might be the turning point that
 later led to the creation of the sharp distiction between the humani
 ties and the natural sciences. Philosophy is in no way different: while
 replying to the Lamias' concerns that he does not seem to have had any
 teachers in philosophy (that is, that he does not have any formal philo
 sophical education), nor has he ever seemed to be reading philosophical
 books,101 Poliziano mentions his friendly relations with the most learned
 philosophers on the one hand, and his trunks full of books of the ancient
 essent et iudices scriptorum omnium soli grammatici, quos ob id etiam criticos voca
 bant." For the sources here see Lamia, ed. Wesseling, 101-2.
 99 Ibid.: "Indignari litterati possunt quod grammatici nunc appellentur etiam qui
 prima doceant elements. Ceterum apud Graecos hoc genus non 'grammatici' sed
 'grammatistae,' non 'litterati' apud Latinos sed 'litteratores' vocabantur." For the
 source here see ibid., 245-47n65. See also Lamia, ed. Wesseling, 100-101, for an
 important account of a change in the usage of the term grammaticus in Poliziano.
 100 Ibid., 246: "Rogo vos, adeone esse me insolentem putatis aut stolidum ut, si
 quis iurisconsultum me salutet aut medicum, non me ab eo derideri prorsus credam?
 Commentarios tamen iamdiu (quod sine arrogantia dictum videri velim) simul in ius
 ipsum civile, simul in medicinae auctores parturio et quidem multis vigiliis, nec aliud
 inde mihi nomen postulo quam grammatici." For the sources here see Lamia, ed.
 Wesseling, 104-5.
 101 Ibid.: "Quomodo enim tu philosophus qui nec magistros habueris nec id genus
 unquam libros attigeris?"
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 Greek commentators on Aristotle, on the other.102 As we have already
 seen in the Praelectio de dialectica, this corpus of the ancient Greek com
 mentators on Aristotle is the basis for Poliziano's courses on Aristotle,
 and we may speculate that these texts were the foundation of Poliziano's
 competence in philosophy in general.103 Such competence was probably
 not enough to turn him into a philosopher in the eyes of some scholastic
 philosophers,104 but nevertheless it is a valuable competence thanks to
 which Poliziano could correct, comment on, and translate some ancient
 philosophical texts, and teach some parts of the Aristotelian corpus at
 the university.
 Poliziano offers the Lamias a deal: to look for the many philosophi
 cal traces in his writings, and if they will find such traces, they will be
 forced to admit that he has learned at least something from some teach
 ers.105 This statement, once again, indicates how important philosophy
 was for Poliziano. The many allusions, explicit and implicit references to
 classical philosophical texts (e.g., Aristotle and his ancient Greek com
 mentators; Plato and the Neoplatonists; the Stoics, mainly Epictetus and
 Seneca; Cicero and Sextus Empiricus) that are found in the Lamia are
 clear evidence of this. Poliziano thus mentions his lectures on the Ethics,
 on Porphyry's Isagoge, on the Categories and on Gilbert of Poitiers's Six
 Principles, and on On Interpretation; he points out that he also taught,
 beyond the accepted practice (extra ordinem), the Sophistical Refuta
 tions, a text that, according to him, was untouched by other teachers
 and almost inexplicable (pene inenodabile).m It seems that Poliziano's
 philological competence led him specifically to pay more attention in his
 courses to the more difficult texts in the Aristotelian corpus. After all
 102 Ibid., 248: "Nec autem allegabo nunc vobis familiaritates quae mihi semper
 cum doctissimis fuere philosophis, non etiam extructa mihi ad tectum usque locula
 menta veterum commentariorum praesertimque Graecorum, qui omnium mihi docto
 res prestantissimi videri soient." For the background here see Lamia, ed. Wesseling,
 107-9. This does not mean of course that Poliziano did not use many other ancient
 philosophical sources; see, e.g., his excessive use of Sextus shown in Lucia Cesarini
 Martineiii, "Sesto Empirico e una dispersa enciclopedia delle arti e delle scienze di
 Angelo Poliziano," Rinascimento 20 (1980): 327-58.
 103 See n. 55 above.
 104 The list of philosophy teachers at the University of Florence in the early 1490s
 presented in Lamia, ed. Wesseling, xiv, n. 6 (and based on Verde's essential volumes
 on the Florentine Studium), is, of course, only a possible starting point for recon
 structing this intellectual context.
 105 Poliziano, Lamia, 248: "Sed ita vobiscum paciscar: si nullus in nostris aut scrip
 tis aut sermonibus odor est philosophiae, nemo audisse me philosophos aut eorum
 attigisse libros arbitretur. Sin plurima sunt in eis quae sectam redoleant aliquam,
 tunc me, si non peperisse ipsum talia, saltern didicisse crédité a doctoribus."
 106 Ibid., 250.
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 this he now turns his attention to the two books of the Prior Analytics,
 books that, on the one hand, are enveloped in plenty of philosophical
 and textual-linguistic difficulties ("multis rerum verborumque difficul
 tatibus involuti"), but on the other hand contain every rule of proper
 reasoning ("in quibus omnis recte ratiocinandi régula continetur"). Poliz
 iano approaches these rules more willingly, eagerly, and spiritedly,107 and
 therefore emphasizes the importance of the Prior Analytics:
 [These books] are almost disregarded in all the schools by our contem
 porary philosophers, not because they are less useful, but rather because
 they are too difficult. Who then would justly be angry with me if I
 should choose this task of interpreting these most difficult texts but
 leave to others the name of a philosopher?108
 We have here an important account of what was going on inside other
 courses on the Aristotelian corpus in the Florentine Studium and prob
 ably also in other studia, where, according to Poliziano, this important
 text was hardly ever taught because of the difficulties it presented; the
 obvious implication is that most of the teachers in those studia were
 incompetent and could not deal properly with these difficulties. As we
 now know, this was not really the case: at least seventeen commentaries
 on the Prior Analytics were written between 1450 and 1492.109
 Poliziano chooses to end the Lamia with a story in which a sharp
 contrast is once again drawn between contemporary and ancient philoso
 phers.110 Apparently the birds once upon a time (olim) neglected good
 advice given them by the owl. Realizing that it was good advice and
 recognizing their mistake on the one hand and the wisdom of that owl
 on the other, they now (nunc) regard the owl with enormous respect,
 since now they want to learn something from it. But all these efforts
 are useless (frustra), Poliziano contends, since only those ancient owls
 were indeed wise ("nam veteres illae noctuae revera sapientes erant");
 107 Ibid.
 108 Ibid.: . . fere in omnibus gymnasiis a nostrae aetatis philosophis, non quia
 parum utiles, sed quia nimis scrupulosi, praetereuntur. Quis mihi igitur iure succen
 seat, si laborem hunc interpretandi difficillima quaeque sumpsero, nomen vero aliis
 philosophi relinquero?" In the annotations added to Poliziano's contract with the
 University of Florence in 1489-90 and 1491-92 we find that utility is mentioned; see
 Celenza (citing documents that were first published by Verde), "Poliziano's Lamia in
 Context" (n. 3 above), 7: "Cum latine tum grece eas lectiones quas studiosis utiles
 esse arbitratur"; 8: ". . . lectiones . . . quas ipsemet utiliores et fructuosiores floren
 tinae iuventuti esse cognoverit."
 109 See Celenza, "Poliziano's Lamia in Context," 43-44.
 110 Poliziano, Lamia, 250-52. For some sources and background see Lamia, ed.
 Wesseling, 113-15.
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 the present situation is that there are many owls around that only have
 owl's feathers, owl's eyes, and owl's beaks. There are many who appear
 to be philosophers and have all the external features, but they do not
 have wisdom. This is yet another example of Poliziano's exclusive
 approach. In this context it means that the only trustworthy way of
 doing philosophy is through philological and historical methods, thanks
 to which we create a bridge to the ancient wisdom, the only authentic
 wisdom that ever existed. Any other way means pretending and con
 cealing the truth. Ancient wisdom is lost, and contemporary pretensions
 to present wisdom in philosophical discussions are useless and based on
 false assumptions.
 Let us now discuss the fourth and last opening lecture that we have by
 Poliziano: his Dialectica of 1493-94.111 One should point out that this text
 is not a systematic account of logic with some full-fledged discussions of
 different fundamental concepts and theories but rather a collection of
 the basic notions in logic presented in a unique way of connecting them.
 While discussing the most truthful principles of argumentation (argu
 mentandi verissima percepta), that is, the principles of Aristotelian logic,
 Poliziano, who compares himself to pilots drawing all-inclusive maps,
 wishing to bring together into one account the many different compo
 nents of logic,112 admits, in the section dedicated to the presentation of
 Aristotle's On Interpretation, that in fact there is no one examination
 made by the dialectician but rather many starting points to a dialectical
 investigation: either investigating the one from the many (induction) or
 the many from the one (deduction), since this investigation does not fol
 low one response.113
 Poliziano follows Aristotle and presents the rules regarding demonstra
 tion (praecepta de demonstratione): demonstrations can be either affirma
 tive or negative, and they can be either universal or particular, or else
 indefinite. There is a demonstrative proposition and there is a dialecti
 cal proposition. The dialectical deals with contradictions, and through a
 process of investigation one should choose the probable option, which is
 then resolved by this proposition.114
 111 For this text I shall use Poliziano, Omnia opera (n. 6 above), aa7v-bb8v.
 112 Ibid., aa7v: "Quod facere navium gubernatores soient, ut maria, portus, litora,
 insulas intra unam paginam colligant, unde quantum per actum quantumque super
 sit itineris ratiocinentur, idem mihi nunc arbitrer faciendum libris his enarrandis,
 quibus argumentandi verissima percepta comprehenduntur."
 113 Ibid., bb2v: "Verum nec una dialectici interrogatio, quae vel unum quaerit de
 pluribus vel de uno plura, quare nec una responsione excipitur."
 114 Ibid., bb3r: "Praecepta igitur de demonstratione daturus Aristoteles ipsam
 prioribus libris ratiocinationem, quoniam communior edocet propositionem finiens,
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 We can find here an interesting account of universals, where Poliz
 iano seems to present a realist point of view, regarding universals as first
 principles that should not be objects of demonstration. First principles
 should be trusted more than conclusions. The subject should be pre
 sented in what is known by itself (per se). Poliziano defines "by itself" as
 either by essence (essentia) or by its own peculiar characteristic (proprio)
 but also in a universal manner (universaliter). A universal (universale) is
 defined as something that is about everything and is the first cause or
 reason for its own existence ("de omni et per se et qua ipsum est nec
 in alio prius").115 Interesingly, Poliziano creates a conceptual relation
 between three terms: first principle (principium), universal (universale),
 and form or idea (idea), all of which are beyond demonstration.
 We should not, according to Poliziano, make a distinction between a
 universal and that which is about everything. Truth and necessity are
 demanded, and they indicate not only the existence of conclusions and
 first principles but also the reason for their existence, not only through
 necessary arguments but also through their own concepts like the one or
 related genus, and then, through universals, because they are not made
 out of corruptible things. But there is no science that can watch over
 its own principles; all sciences are reduced to the one that is called wis
 dom.116
 Poliziano is not only expressing here a philosophical position that is
 associated with the realists, and mostly with the followers of the via
 antiqua; he also regards logic as a discipline that is essentially related
 to some fundamental philosophical concepts such as truth and necessity,
 science and wisdom, and thus he rejects the view according to which
 logic is regarded as an instrument only.117
 quae aliquid aut confirmet aut neget de aliquo. Sed vel universalem esse ait, vel
 particularem, vel indefinitam, tum aliud demonstrativam propositionem, atque aliud
 dialecticam, quoniam sumat ilia propositionem contradictionis alteram. Haec ipsius
 contradictionis interrogationem si quaeras illius optionem quod verisimile videatur si
 respondeas. Terminum quo propositio resolvatur."
 115 Ibid., bb5r: "Principiis credendum potius quam conclusionibus. Praedicatum
 dici per se de subiecto debet, priusque de omni, per se nunc accipe vel essentia vel
 proprio, sed et universaliter, universale hie intellige, quod et de omni et per se et
 qua ipsum est nec in alio prius. Nec ideas demonstraveris."
 116 Ibid.: "Cum discrimen inter universale non cernimus et quod de omni. Nec Veri
 tas modo sed et nécessitas exigitur. Eaque non conclusionum modo sed et prineipio
 rum, non modo esse indicans sed et cur sit, non modo ex necessariis sed et e suis,
 hoc est ex iis, quae vel unius, vel cognati generis, tum ex universalibus, nec enim
 corruptibilium, nec autem scientia ulla sua tuetur prineipia, sed ad unam rediguntur
 omnes, quae sapientia vocatur."
 117 See n. 53 above.
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 We establish, as the subject of that truth that was just mentioned
 by Poliziano, mainly first causes.118 At this point Poliziano refers to the
 term axiom; there are some axioms that befit all the sciences, and there
 are two faculties that establish knowledge or science: wisdom and dia
 lectic.119 What we have here is an interesting correlation between axioms
 (■axiomata) and faculties (facultates). Poliziano presents a clear and rather
 standard hierarchy: universal is preferable to particular, affirmation to
 negation, correct demonstration to the one that is derived from impos
 sible circumstance. Here, again, we find the term faculty: a superior fac
 ulty is that which teaches us about a cause of something else, that which
 is focused on the intelligible and the universal, and finally that which
 has simpler principles.120
 We further find some more standard but nevertheless important dis
 tinctions including the one between knowledge and opinion: just as there
 are different principles, so there are different sciences, and the same issue
 can be demonstrated by various means. There is no science of the acci
 dental, since a sensible object cannot be demonstrated, but the origin
 of demonstration is in sensible matters; between different sciences there
 are no similar unique principles nor common principles, and opinion on
 the one hand and knowledge or science on the other differ both in their
 subject and in their manner of estimating.121
 Just before leaving the discussion of On Interpretation and moving on,
 in the last section of the Dialectica, to present each of the books of Aris
 totle's Topics, Poliziano provides an interesting account of a compromise
 between the position of the realist and the nominalist:
 At last we have in the midst of our soul the seed of an absent proposi
 tion, when that universal that is the one beyond the many is produced
 by the senses, imagination, memory, intellect, forms, and some concepts.
 118 Ibid.: "Quaeque [sapientia] primas et easdem maxime causas considérât, subiec
 tum statuimus esse."
 119 Ibid.: "Proprium quaerimus quid significet, axiomatis utrunque debemus. Quo
 rum interdum vi utimur potius, sed et quaedam sunt axiomata, quae scientiis con
 gruunt omnibus, duae scientiam facultates constituunt, sapientia et dialectica."
 120 Ibid.: "Particulari praestat universale, affirmatio negationi, iusta demonstra
 tio illi quae sit ex impossibili. Potior ilia et prior facultas quae causam docet alte
 rius, quae circa intelligibile, circa universale vertitur, quae superior, quae simpliciora
 habet principia."
 121 Ibid., bb5r-v: "Nam quarum diversa principia sunt, hae diversae scientiae, res
 eadem variis demonstratur mediis, nulla fortuiti scientia, nihil sensibile demonstra
 tur, demonstrationis origo in sensibus, diversarum scientiarum, nec eadem propria
 principia, nec communia. Etiam utra opinio et subiecto differt a scientia et aestima
 tionis modo. Nec eiusdem omnino rei opinio et scientia."
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 This principle of comprehension is the intellect, that is the recognition of
 principles of a knowable object.122
 The universal seems here to be, on the one hand, an abstraction cre
 ated by human faculties, but nevertheless, on the other hand, it seems
 to have real existence behind the phenomena, and it takes the form of a
 seed inside our soul.
 In the Topics, we are being taught how to examine arguments, and
 dialectic is mainly treated here as reasoning from probable arguments
 (.ratiocinatio ex probabilibus), differently from forensic dialectic, since in
 forensic dialectic things are presented as probable that only seem to be
 probable.123 Poliziano then enumerates the four instruments of the dia
 lectician: approving propositions, distinguishing between comprehensions,
 finding out distinctions, and considering similarity.124
 Poliziano ends this account by pointing out the importance of Aris
 totelian logic for anyone's own argumentation and demonstration, and,
 in the case of a debate, for attacking or defending positions, since this
 whole art is about reasoning, demonstrations, distinctions, and cavils.125
 Let us draw some conclusions. In the Panepistemon we have encoun
 tered an unusual and rather original division of sciences and arts, which
 reflects a new conception of knowledge and challenges both classical and
 medieval divisions while presenting a fresh account of the practical dis
 122 Ibid., bb5v: "Postremo semen carentis medio propositions in animo habemus,
 quando universale illud, quod unum praeter multa sit sensibus imaginatione memo
 ria intellectu, formisque et notis quibusdam paritur. Principium scientiae intellectus
 hoc est cognitio principiorum scibilis rei."
 123 Ibid.: "Nunc et Topica percurramus. Disserere hic in quo vis negotio docemur.
 Tractaturque dialectica potissimum ratiocinatio ex probabilibus, differens a litigi
 osa. Quoniam in ea non tarn probabilia sunt quam videntur." Interestingly, Poliz
 iano presents here the standard Aristotelian definition of accepted or common views
 (evSoÇa), the starting point of any scientific investigation, which was wrongly under
 stood in the Latin tradition at least since Boethius as probabilia, possibly under the
 influence of Cicero and because of a lack of familiarity with the ancient skeptical
 terminology in Greek as it is reflected in Sextus Empiricus.
 124 Ibid., bb6r: "Cernitur et idem et alterorum quod utrunque genere specie
 numéro, quatuor dialectici instrumenta: acceptio propositionum, distinctio intellec
 tuum, inventio differentiarum, consideratio similitudinis."
 123 Ibid., bb8v: "Hactenus Aristotelis ars omnis vel ratiocinandi, vel peculiariter
 demonstrandi, vel differendi, vel postremo cavillandi. Quam qui penitus spexerit,
 edidicerit, exercuerit, et secum quod opus est argumentando colliget, ac demon
 strabit, et cum alio disputans facile quod volet, aut impugnabit, aut tuebitur."
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 ciplines. A complex definition of history allows Poliziano to develop a
 notion of "philosophical literature," which again breaks with standard
 academic disciplinary divisions on an institutional level on the one
 hand, and offers the possibility of a separation (which indeed happened
 much later) between natural sciences and the humanities on the other
 hand. In his discussion of rhetoric and dialectic, Poliziano turns to Mar
 tianus Capella's De nuptiis as a main source, a fact that shows that our
 humanist was not, after all, that allergic to works that served as medi
 eval textbooks.
 In the Praeledio de dialectica we have found an important account of
 "dialectic," both the concept and the discipline. While tacitly using Plo
 tinus, Poliziano is implicitly pointing out two different meanings of dia
 lectic: an Aristotelian and a Neoplatonic. Poliziano also establishes the
 relations between liberal arts and philosophy, where apparently the lib
 eral arts prepare the ground for the study of philosophy.
 The important definition of history that was presented in the Pan
 epistemon receives an interesting echo in the Lamia, where Poliziano
 establishes the position of the historian and interpreter of philosophy
 as against that advocated by contemporary scholastic philosophers.
 His exclusive historical model — prioritizing classical sources includ
 ing philosophical texts — was part of Poliziano's efforts to show his
 students what he regarded as the proper manner of philosophizing. But
 the new philological and historical methods as applied to philosophi
 cal texts had yet another important implication, the first glimpse of
 which we have already noticed in the Panepistemon: the beginning of
 the separation and distinction between the natural sciences, which are
 going to become more practical and technical, and the humanities,
 which are going to provide the historical dimension and critical reflec
 tion about natural and other sciences. It might come as a surprise to
 some Renaissance scholars to find here Poliziano's critique of rhetoric
 and his defense of the concept of philosophical truth, following some
 well-known classical models.
 In Poliziano's account of universals as found in his Dialectica we have
 noticed his attitude toward the tension between the realists and the
 nominalists: while being somehow closer to the first, he nevertheless is
 looking for a compromise between these two different positions. We have
 also found here a general appreciation of logic as a discipline, as strongly
 connected to necessity and truth, and thus as much more than a mere
 instrument. Poliziano discusses here the relations between first causes,
 axioms, and faculties, and argues that wisdom and dialectic are the two
 faculties that are crucial for any kind of knowledge or science.
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 In light of all this evidence, it is clear that the relations between
 Renaissance humanists like Poliziano and philosophy as a discipline, and
 even more so Renaissance Aristotelianisms and scholasticisms, should
 be reconsidered and better contextualized. As the present study has
 attempted to show, it is among Renaissance humanists and scholastics
 that we can find the first steps toward the modern separation between
 the natural sciences and the humanities.
 Maynooth University
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